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KILL CAMMER: SECURITIES LITIGATION 
WITHOUT JUNK SCIENCE 
J.B. HEATON* 
ABSTRACT 
Securities litigation is a hotbed of junk science concerning 
market efficiency. This Article explains why and suggests a way 
out. In its 1988 decision in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court 
endorsed the fraud on the market presumption for securities 
traded in an efficient market. Faced with the task of determining 
market efficiency, courts throughout the nation embraced the ad 
hoc speculations of a first-mover district court that proclaimed, 
in Cammer v. Bloom, how to allege (and presumably prove) facts 
that would do just that. The Cammer court’s analysis did not 
rely on financial economics for its notions, but instead regurgi-
tated the assertions of a single plaintiff’s expert affidavit—from a 
securities law professor, not a financial economist—and a securi-
ties law treatise equally uninformed by the relevant field. The 
result has been thirty years of junk science in securities adjudica-
tion. This Article traces the development of the fraud on the mar-
ket theory from its pre-efficient-markets-hypothesis roots through 
a brief “gilding the lily” phase where an appeal to social science 
results on market efficiency was only an ancillary, bolstering 
argument for already-sufficient precedent for the fraud on the mar-
ket presumption, to the requirement that litigants plead and 
prove efficiency using indicia with no support in financial eco-
nomics. The way out of this embarrassing state of affairs is to 
return to the roots of fraud on the market in the non-technical 
notion of “a free and open public market” that inquires only 
whether the market for the security at issue is open to active buy-
ers and sellers and is not subject to substantial seller lockups or 

* J.B. Heaton, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, jb@jbheaton.com. For very helpful 
comments and suggestions on a preliminary draft, I am grateful to Jacquelyn 
Bouwman, Alon Brav, Brad Cornell, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Marc Gross, 
Davidson Heath, Ashley Keller, Tom Miles, and Eric Posner. 
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bans on short selling. It is reasonable to presume that prices in 
such free and open public markets can be distorted by fraud, a 
presumption that is then rebuttable by establishing (1) that the 
alleged fraud in fact had no price impact; (2) that there are sub-
stantial limits on the ability of active investors to buy and sell in 
the market, such that the market is not a “free and open public” one; 
or (3) that the plaintiff would have made their purchase or sale at 
the affected price even knowing of the falsity of the alleged mis-
representation. This formulation is consistent with all controlling 
Supreme Court opinions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal securities litigation1 is a hotbed of junk science 
about market efficiency. It was not always so. It need not be the 
case going forward. 
 Securities litigation’s fraud on the market presumption 
“says that all traders who purchase stock in an efficient market 
are presumed to have relied on the accuracy of a company’s pub-
lic statements.”2 Junk science entered securities litigation when 
courts applying the fraud on the market presumption embraced 
the ad hoc speculations of a federal district court in Cammer v. 
Bloom.3 The Cammer court was the first to set out a list of facts 
that—it asserted—would indicate an efficient market for the 
security at issue.4 Key facts to allege were: 
 
1. large trading volume;5 
2. a significant number of reports by securities analysts;6 

1 This Article focuses on securities litigation under Section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018), and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
2 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 n.6 (2011). Professors 
Hu and Morley state the rationale for the presumption well: 
This is why federal securities law has developed the so-called 
“fraud on the market” doctrine: even if an investor is not aware 
of a piece of information, she may nevertheless be said to have 
relied on it, because the information will inevitably influence 
the price at which an investor can buy or sell. 
Henry T. C. Hu & John D. Morley, A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-
Traded Funds, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 908 (2018). The fraud on the market theory 
has long been criticized by some securities scholars. See generally, e.g., William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 
160 U. Penn. L. Rev. 69 (2011) (arguing that fraud on the market class actions lack 
academic support). However, the fraud on the market theory has generally stood 
the test of time. See James Cameron Spindler, We Have a Consensus on Fraud on 
the Market—and It’s Wrong, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 67, 69–73 (2017) (evaluat-
ing and rejecting critiques). This is likely because there is no other effective 
way to provide deterrence against corporate fraud in modern securities mar-
kets. Cf. Antonio E. Bernardo et al., A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 1, 26, 39 (2000) (arguing that legal presumptions balance the 
social costs of redistributive litigation with the need for deterrence). 
3 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 (D.N.J. 1989). 
4 Id. at 1286. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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3. the presence of market-makers and arbitrageurs in 
the security;7 
4. eligibility of the issuer to file an S-3 registration 
statement;8 and 
5. a history of immediate stock9 price movements in 
response to unexpected corporate events and finan-
cial releases.10 
 
Since these so-called “Cammer factors” came into play, 
another federal district court added three more factors—(1) the 
capitalization of the company; (2) the bid-ask spread of the stock; 
and (3) the percentage of stock not held by insiders.11 Alas, none 
of these factors had—or have today—any support in the vast body 
of research on efficient markets as methods of distinguishing 
efficient from inefficient prices.12 When they get us to the right 

7 Id. at 1286–87. 
8 Id. at 1287. 
9 Much litigation, and much discussion of the fraud on the market pre-
sumption, focuses on stocks rather than other securities. The best evidence 
strongly suggests, however, that the markets for bonds and options are at 
least equally efficient. See, e.g., Michael Hartzmark et al., Fraud on the Mar-
ket: Analysis of the Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market, 2011 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 654, 656 (2011) (analyzing bond market efficiency and criticizing 
the decision of the court in In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig. (AIG), 265 
F.R.D. 157, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding the bond market inefficient for one 
of the world’s largest companies)); Edith S. Hotchkiss & Tavy Ronen, The 
Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An Intraday Analysis, 
15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1325, 1352 (2002) (finding bonds as efficiently priced as 
their same-company stocks). 
10 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287. 
11 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
12 Financial economists have argued before that at least some of the 
Cammer factors are unconnected to financial economic research, but this prior 
work has not traced the doctrinal introduction of the factors, examined each 
systematically against the financial economic evidence, or proposed that they 
should all be abandoned. See Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market 
Theory and the Indicators of Common Stocks’ Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285, 
290 (1994) (“The various market efficiency criteria applied so far by courts are 
ad hoc. We know of no systematic body of evidence showing that these or any 
other criteria distinguish between efficient and inefficient stocks. Nor are we 
aware of evidence supporting specific cutoff values of these criteria.”) I pointed 
this out with Alon Brav in Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 
28 J. CORP. L. 517, 535 (2003) (“The use of efficient markets theory in many 
reported cases is inexpert at best, erratic at worst. This inconsistent nature of 

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answer it is usually just because the Cammer factors are proxies 
for being a big, publicly traded company and such companies are 
almost always traded in an efficient market.13 When they fail, it 
is because they give courts too much flexibility to find inefficiency 
where it almost surely does not exist.14 
 The Cammer court lifted its factors willy-nilly from an expert 
affidavit of a securities law professor (not a financial economist) 

efficient markets evidence in reported cases is perhaps unsurprising since the 
‘science’ supporting an ability to distinguish efficient and inefficient markets 
for litigation purposes is highly suspect.”). A number of legal commentators 
have recognized the lack of connection between the Cammer factors and financial 
economics. See also James D. Cox, Fraud on the Market After Amgen, 9 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 (2013): 
[T]here is nothing in the EMH holding that investors react 
differently in trading publicly traded stocks that are within 
the Cammer factors than how they react when trading in pub-
licly traded shares of stocks in smaller capitalization issuers 
that do not meet all the Cammer factors. 
Allen Ferrell & Andrew Roper, Price Impact, Materiality, and Halliburton II, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 558 (2015) (“The finance literature does not support 
viewing the first four Cammer factors as formulated and applied as constituting 
a reliable test for establishing semi-strong form market efficiency as they are 
commonly invoked prior to class certification. The fifth Cammer factor (a 
cause-and-effect relationship between public news and changes in stock price) can 
provide a more reliable indication of market efficiency when properly evalu-
ated. However, courts’ understanding of what constitutes a reliable indication 
can vary substantially between cases and between courts.”); Mukesh Bajaj et 
al., Assessing Market Efficiency for Reliance on the Fraud-On-The-Market 
Doctrine After Wal-Mart and Amgen, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS 
ACTIONS 161, 183 (James Langenfeld ed., 2014) (criticizing the Cammer fac-
tors); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. L. 671, 
675 (2014) (arguing for the elimination of “the current exclusive focus on the 
Cammer factors”). One commentator has argued “that the Cammer factors 
are profoundly flawed” but asserts without evidence that they “are likely biased to 
finding a higher degree of efficiency than actually exists.” Joseph A. Grundfest, 
Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 BUS. L. 
307, 378 (2014). Professor Grundfest is wrong; the Cammer factors are almost 
surely biased against finding efficiency where it exists, a fact best evidenced by 
cases finding inefficiency for securities that almost any (disinterested) finan-
cial economist would characterize as efficient. 
13 See David Tabak, Testing Securities Market Efficiency With Cammer Fac-
tors, LAW360 (Feb. 5, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://www-law360-com.proxy.wm.edu 
/articles/1125546/testing-securities-market-efficiency-with-cammer-factors 
[https://perma.cc/3HZ7-AZ2W]. 
14 Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indica-
tors of Common Stocks’ Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285, 290 (1994). 
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submitted by the plaintiff,15 supplemented with citations to the 
speculations of two other securities lawyers (one a professor,16 
one a practitioner,17 neither a financial economist) in a securi-
ties treatise.18 None of these factors were anchored in the social 
science of efficient markets research.19 Nevertheless, the Cammer 
factors quickly became a mainstay of class-action securities fraud 
litigation. The lure of lucrative expert witness testimony led 
trained financial economists who surely knew better—and some-
times admitted they did20—to apply them in court. Reported 
opinions are filled with painstaking analyses of these factors,21 

15 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989) (“While the Amended 
Complaint does not contain most of the foregoing types of allegations, the Poser 
Affidavit does.”). The expert was Norman Poser, then professor of law at 
Brooklyn Law School. Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The “Less Than” Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-
Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 129 n.115 (2004) (citing Aff. of Norman 
Poser, Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989)). 
16 Alan R. Bromberg was professor of law at Southern Methodist University 
School of Law. $2 Million Gift From Wife of Late SMU Professor Alan Bromberg, 
SMU (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.smu.edu/News/2015/alan-r-bromberg-gift-18 
dec2015 [https://perma.cc/3DUZ-3BG8].  
17 Lewis D. Lowenfels practiced securities law in New York City. Lewis D. 
Lowenfels Esq. L. OFF. LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, http://www.tolinslowenfels.com 
/LDL.html [https://perma.cc/YVR7-V9JK].  
18 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286 (citing Bromberg & Lowenfels, 4 Securi-
ties Fraud and Commodities Fraud, § 8.6 (Aug. 1988)). 
19 See infra Section I.B. 
20 Willis v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-604, 2017 WL 1074048, at *3 (S.D. 
Ohio Mar. 17, 2017) (“Defendants, through their expert Dr. Paul Gompers 
(‘Dr. Gompers’), contest the usefulness of the Cammer factors for determining 
market efficiency, asserting that accepted academic literature does not find 
the first four Cammer factors relevant to a determination of market efficiency.”); 
Ferrell & Roper, supra note 12, at 558 (“Courts have adopted a number of 
factors, most prominently the well-known Cammer and Krogman factors, to assess 
the efficiency of the market for a security for class certification purposes. These 
court-adopted factors can often effectively prevent defendants from successfully 
challenging market efficiency for class certification purposes even though these 
court-adopted factors have not been shown to provide a reliable test of market 
efficiency using commonly accepted econometric methods in the literature.”). 
21 Very recent examples including the following: Angley v. UTI Worldwide 
Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1120–27 (C.D. Cal. 2018); In re Banc of California 
Sec. Litig., 326 F.R.D. 640, 648–50 (C.D. Cal. 2018), leave to appeal denied 
sub nom; Garcia v. Banc of California, Inc., No. 18-80068, 2018 WL 4474393 
(9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2018); City of Cape Coral Mun. Firefighters’ Ret. Plan v. 

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none of which explain anything about the question at hand: was 
the market for this security efficient in the sense required by the 
fraud on the market presumption? 
 What is especially strange about this state of affairs—and 
also indicative of the way out—is that such detailed inquiry into 
the nature of a securities market was unnecessary. The earliest 
fraud on the market cases22 did not invoke the efficient markets 

Emergent Biosolutions, Inc., HQ, 322 F. Supp. 3d 676, 687–90 (D. Md. 2018); 
Wilson v. LSB Indus., Inc., No. 15CIV7614RAGWG, 2018 WL 3913115, at *9–*16 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2018); Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 328 
F.R.D. 86, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). The result of this focus on the Cammer factors 
is a large part of litigation for class certification. See Kevin S. Haeberle & M. 
Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law, 85 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1313, 1355 (2018): 
The result is a kind of dystopian judicial proceeding in which 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense lawyers argue their entire 
case at a point in the litigation when little is known, focusing 
on things like market efficiency, and real issues about the ap-
propriate scope of the litigation to serve its compensation and 
deterrence ends are largely ignored. 
Tara E. Levens, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency Trading and Secu-
rities Class Actions, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1521 (2015): 
In determining market efficiency, most courts rely on the fac-
tors laid out in Cammer: the average weekly trading volume, 
the number of analysts following the stock, the number of 
market makers and arbitrageurs, the issuing company’s eligi-
bility to file a Form S-3 registration statement, and the cause-
and-effect relationship between corporate events or financial 
releases and the stock price. Courts disagree about whether all 
of these factors must be satisfied, which are the most important, 
which should be the most heavily weighted, and what the ap-
propriate thresholds are for satisfying each factor. 
22 The term “fraud on the market” first appears in a reported case, the 
1969 opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), amended, 49 
F.R.D. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Andrew C. Baker, Single-Firm Event Studies, 
Securities Fraud, and Financial Crisis: Problems of Inference, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. 1207, 1216 (2016) (citing Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y 1969); 
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975)) (“The FOTM theory 
was first adopted by the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
in 1969 and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1975.”). The term is 
credited to Abe Pomerantz’s firm then known as Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek & 
Block, which represented the Herbst plaintiffs. See Marc I. Gross, The Road 
Map for Class Certification Post–Halliburton II, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485 (2015) 
(“The concept that defendants’ misrepresentations create a ‘fraud on the 
market’ (‘FOM’) was first coined nearly fifty years ago by Abe Pomerantz, the 

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hypothesis. Courts instead embraced the fraud on the market 
presumption on the premise that Congress intended in the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide “a means by which inves-
tors may recover against market manipulators in federal court.”23 
One way to manipulate a market was to make material misrep-
resentations that would cause some traders—but not necessarily 
the plaintiffs—to transact at different prices than they would have 
transacted without the material misrepresentation. A manipulator’s 
misrepresentations comprised two deceptions: one contained in 
the untrue representation and one in the form of the artificial price 
the misrepresentation caused.24 Because of the “‘causal nexus’ 
between the alleged misstatements and an inflated price[,]”25 a 
plaintiff was “misled ... as to the fair market value of the stock”26 
and protected by securities law unless he would have traded any-
way even knowing of the false representation.27 In these cases, 

pioneer of shareholder rights litigation, in Herbst v. Able.”) The Herbst deci-
sion was especially well-suited to a presumption that investors relied on an 
artificially created price because the case involved the conversion of debt into 
common stock. The conversion became more attractive at the allegedly inflated 
price. Interestingly, the number of Rule 10b-5 class action filings increased 
substantially in 1970. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Development of Securities 
Law in the United States, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 325, 334 (2009) (presenting evi-
dence on the increase in Rule 10b-5 filings). Whether this can be explained by 
the Herbst decision remains for future study. 
23 In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Of course, 
what exactly Congress intended in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 has long been discussed and contested. See, e.g., Steven Thel, The Origi-
nal Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
385, 385 (1990) (analyzing Congressional intent with respect to Section 10(b)). 
24 In essence, the early cases recognized what later scholars have recog-
nized as well: that misrepresentations can distort price—or not—whether or 
not the markets themselves are perfect in the economists’ sense. See, e.g., Bebchuk 
& Ferrell, supra note 12, at 671 (arguing for the unimportance of market 
efficiency in determining fraudulent price distortion). 
25 In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. at 100. 
26 Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1978). 
27 Blackie, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Requiring direct proof from each purchaser that he relied on a 
particular representation when purchasing would defeat recovery 
by those whose reliance was indirect, despite the fact that the 
causational chain is broken only if the purchaser would have pur-
chased the stock even had he known of the misrepresentation. 
We decline to leave such open market purchasers unprotected. 

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all that was required was that the market for the security at 
issue be “free and open.”28 Appealing to efficient markets theory 
for support was gilding the lily. Quickly, however, the supportive 
social science that was meant as icing on the cake became all 
that mattered. 
 But here is the cold, hard reality: the Cammer factors and 
the three others added later—even the oft-praised fifth Cammer 
factor (a history of immediate stock price movements in response to 
unexpected corporate events and financial releases)29—cannot 
determine whether the market for a security at issue in securities 
fraud litigation trades in an efficient market. If tested efficiency 
is necessary for use of the fraud on the market presumption—
and it is not clear it should be30—then there is only one test that 

The statute and rule are designed to foster an expectation that 
securities markets are free from fraud an expectation on which 
purchasers should be able to rely. 
Id. 
28 Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969). 
29 Courts and commentators often assert that the fifth Cammer factor is 
most important or most related to market efficiency. Simpson v. Specialty Retail 
Concepts, 823 F. Supp. 353, 355 n.6 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (“The fifth Cammer 
factor is perhaps the most important one.”); Bradford Cornell, Market Effi-
ciency and Securities Litigation: Implications of the Appellate Decision in 
Thane, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 237, 245 n.22 (2011) (“The fifth Cammer factor, 
the reaction of the stock price to unexpected news events, is a direct measure 
of efficiency.”); Bradford Cornell & John Haut, How Efficient Is Sufficient: 
Applying the Concept of Market Efficiency in Litigation, 74 BUS. L. 417, 421 
(2019) (“Only one of the Cammer and Krogman criteria speaks to a direct as-
sessment of efficiency that is amenable to scientific quantification—the speed 
with which security prices respond to information, in other words informa-
tional efficiency.”) This might be correct if applied as stated, but the analysis 
in fact turns on whether price reactions are “statistically significant,” a re-
quirement that renders the examination of price reactions unreliable for 
determining efficiency. 
30 The case for the unimportance of market efficiency for the policies be-
hind the fraud on the market presumption is set out in Jonathan R. Macey, 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Netter, Lessons from Fi-
nancial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. 
Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) (“We suggest that the focus of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Basic is misplaced: what determines whether 
investors were justified in relying on the integrity of the market price is not 
the efficiency of the relevant market but rather whether a misstatement distorted 
the price of the affected security.”). 
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has significant probative value and is generally accepted: a securi-
ty-specific test (potentially made up of several possible subtests) 
for actionable (trading-relevant) return predictability in the se-
curity.31 It is a test that is consistent with a statement of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit “that market price 
responds so quickly to new information that ordinary investors can-
not make trading profits on the basis of such information.”32 This is 
a test on which most financial economists agree.33 
 What is not reliable are the tests currently used, the most 
deceptive of which is the so-called Cammer “fifth factor”: exam-
ining the history of price reactions or non-reactions to news for 
statistical significance.34 The errors in the interpretation of this 
sort of evidence ought to be the subject of an introductory college 
statistics class, but instead these interpretive errors shape the 
outcome of multimillion- (and multibillion-) dollar litigation.35 
News need not cause a statistically significant price reaction, be-
cause statistical significance is simply a measure of the relative 
size of the price impact; the actual efficient-market impact may 
be smaller than that measure. Conversely, the existence of a 
statistically significant price impact does not imply the need for 
some observable news event, since efficient prices can move for 
reasons that are unobservable. Pretending otherwise is nothing 
short of a fraud on the court.36 
 Perhaps the greatest embarrassment of the junk science 
in securities litigation is the mutual complicity of plaintiffs and 
defendants in continuing it. Rather than stand firm and challenge 
the lack of foundational reliability behind the Cammer factors, 
plaintiffs have pursued them with vigor. It was a set of plain-
tiffs, after all, who first offered the affidavit in support of those 
factors.37 Defendants at first cherry picked unmet factors and 

31 See In re Poly Medica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005). 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Daniel Bettencourt & Steven Feinstein, What a Solar Eclipse Has to Do 
with Market Efficiency, LAW 360, 1, 2–3 (Nov. 17, 2017). 
35 Id. 
36 A note to the courts: if you are judging whether a market is efficient by 
looking for statistically significant price reactions, you are doing it wrong. 
See, e.g., Hatamian v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 14-CV-00226 YGR, 2016 
WL 1042502, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2016) (“[L]ack of a statistically signifi-
cant price increase does not necessarily equate to lack of price impact.”). 
37 See Ferrillo et al., supra note 15, at 106. 
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argued that the market was inefficient if not all the factors were 
present. Ultimately, however, the defendants and their paid experts 
seized on the most nonsensical (and most exploitable) factor—
the Cammer fifth factor—and argued that absence of statistically 
significant price moves indicated inefficiency, never admitting 
that this interpretation was illogical and intellectually dishonest.38 
Since plaintiffs at times benefitted from this factor when statistical 
significance was present, a strange equilibrium of agreement to 
apply junk science emerged.39 
 Part I traces the use of the efficient markets hypothesis in 
fraud on the market cases from a means of bolstering existing 
precedent for the reliability of a “free and open public market[ ]” 
to the assumption that efficiency was a necessary prerequisite to 
the presumption.40 While the United States Supreme Court in Basic 
v. Levinson41 did not state explicitly that efficiency in the sense 
the term is used in financial economics was necessary for the 
application of the fraud on the market presumption, the implicit 
suggestion remained42 and some language in later cases from the 
Court is consistent with such a requirement.43 Combined with 

38 See, e.g., Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 477 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
39 As a lawyer and financial economist, my own domain-specific knowledge 
is limited, but one must wonder in what other parts of litigation such an equi-
librium has emerged. 
40 See infra Part I.  
41 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
42 This view is summed up well by In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
773 F. Supp. 342, 356 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
While the Supreme Court in Basic did not explicitly approve the 
Sixth Circuit’s requirement that ‘a plaintiff must allege and 
prove ... that the shares were traded on an efficient market,’ ... 
courts have interpreted the Court’s discussion of the lower court 
opinion as implicitly approving of this requirement. See, e.g., 
Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197–98 (6th 
Cir. 1990); Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776, 
781 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.Supp. 1264, 1285 
n.34 (D.N.J. 1989); Stinson v. Van Valley Development Corp., 
714 F. Supp. 132, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff’d, 897 F.2d 524 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  
Id. at 356 n.18 (citations omitted). 
43 See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 811 
(2011) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 484 U.S. 224 (1988)) (“It is undisputed 
that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain things in order to invoke 

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the momentum of existing fraud on the market case law before 
Basic, efficiency in the sense of financial economics became a 
required allegation in fraud on the market cases.44 Cammer was 
the first case post-Basic to offer a structured list of allegations 
that might be sufficient, and courts adopted that list with little 
thought or analysis, encouraged, perhaps, by the embrace of the 
factors by the expert witnesses who came before them.45 
 Part II explains why the Cammer factors are junk science. 
Put simply, none of the Cammer factors (nor the additional factors 
added since) help establish whether the market for a security at 
issue is efficient in the sense of financial economics. The Article 
first explains how financial economists actually test for market 
efficiency. It is not by way of anything resembling the Cammer 
factors. The Article then explains why the Cammer factors and the 
additional factors are not useful for determining this sort of effi-
ciency of the market for a security at issue in securities fraud 
litigation. 
 Part III argues for securities litigation without junk science 
through a return to the common sense approach of the earliest 
fraud on the market cases: if a security trades in a free and open 
public market, then it is, in the sense of controlling Supreme 
Court precedent, “efficient” and plaintiffs should be able to in-
voke the (rebuttable) fraud on the market presumption. The 
Cammer factors remain unhelpful in making this determination. 
What is important to the determination of a “free and open public 
market” is the ability of active investors—investors other than 
passive funds that will buy or sell according to index inclusion or 
the like—to buy and sell in the market. This includes the deter-
mination whether there are substantial restrictions on participa-
tion like substantial lockups of potential sellers or bans on short 

Basic’s rebuttable presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example, 
that plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations were 
publicly known (else how would the market take them into account?), that 
the stock traded in an efficient market, and that the relevant transaction 
took place ‘between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time 
the truth was revealed.’”). 
44 See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1261, 1281 (D.N.J. 1989). 
45 See, e.g., Kelley v. Mid-Am. Racing Stables, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 405, 409 
(W.D. Okla. 1990). 
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selling. This approach is hardly anachronistic. Public markets that 
are free and open are necessarily subject to the profit-seeking of 
speculators, or so-called arbitrageurs.46 An enormous amount of 
capital chases profit opportunities in the smallest of crevices, 
from life insurance policy acquisition to litigation funding to gold 
and silver coins to, of course, securities.47 The idea that a public 
market for a security is not subject to the scrutiny and trading of 
speculators is usually facially implausible absent evidence of sub-
stantial limits on their trading.48 I propose that plaintiffs be al-
lowed to allege the existence of such free and open public markets 
and defendants be allowed two possible showings at the class 
certification stage to rebut the availability of the fraud on the 
market presumption. First, as exists now, an opportunity to show 
no price impact, though this must be done without the use of 
junk science single-firm event studies.49 Second, an opportunity 

46 Arthur E. Foulkes, Speculators important in free markets, TRIBUNE STAR 
(June 20, 2008), https://www.tribstar.com/news/business_news/arthur-foulkes 
-speculators-important-in-free-markets/article_709e0232-d741-5525-a746-83c0 
d1545992.html [https://perma.cc/LNH3-HNE8]. 
47 Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Finan-
cial Crisis: Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemp-
tion, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 49 (2012). 
48 Id. at 87.  
49 See Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: 
Low Power, Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583 (2015) 
(discussing the unreliability of single-firm event studies). This work has become 
influential in the courts, leading the most astute courts to reject the need for 
event studies in securities litigation. See In re EZCORP, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 19-
90006, 2019 WL 1428008 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 2019); In re Petrobras Sec., 862 
F.3d 250, 278 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Brav & Heaton, supra, at 584–608) 
(“Event studies offer the seductive promise of hard numbers and dispassion-
ate truth, but methodological constraints limit their utility in the context of 
single-firm analyses.”); Rooney v. EZCORP, Inc., 330 F.R.D. 439, 450 (W.D. 
Tex. 2019) (citing Brav & Heaton, supra, at 602) (“A statistically significant 
price adjustment following a corrective disclosure is evidence the original 
misrepresentation did, in fact, affect the stock price. The converse, however, 
is not true—the absence of a statistically significant price adjustment does 
not show the stock price was unaffected by the misrepresentation.”); Pirnik v. 
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., 327 F.R.D. 38, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting 
Brav & Heaton, supra, at 593) (“With respect to the latter point, however, it 
is Defendants’ burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the absence 
of price impact, and they cannot meet that burden by pointing to a handful of dates 
and suggesting, without further explanation, that one should have seen price 
impact on those dates but did not. As for the former, ‘statistical significance 

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to show that the market is, in fact, not a free and open public 
market in the sense that there are substantial limitations on 
buyers and sellers that do not allow their free interaction. At the 
merits stage, defendants should also, of course, be able to show 
that any particular plaintiff would have made their purchase or 
sale at the affected price even knowing of the falsity of the al-
leged misrepresentation. This formulation is consistent with all 
controlling Supreme Court opinions. It is implementable today. 
I.EFFICIENT MARKETS AND THE ROAD TO CAMMER 
A.Fraud on the Market, B.C.—Before Cammer 
 Early fraud on the market cases50 made a modest demand 
of securities markets: that market prices be “validly set”51 in the 

is simply describing a set of returns that would be unusual to observe if there 
was no price impact.’”); Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays 
PLC, 310 F.R.D. 69, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Brav & Heaton, supra, at 584) (“In 
academic research, event studies are almost exclusively conducted with large 
samples of securities from a number of different firms. When the event study 
is used in a litigation to examine a single firm, the chances of finding statisti-
cally significant results decrease dramatically.”). 
50 There were almost two decades of fraud on the market litigation before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Basic, something even the best of students often miss: 
Before Basic, securities-fraud plaintiffs suing as a class could 
usually establish the “reliance” element only by showing that 
each class member was aware of and traded a security based on a 
specific falsehood. This requirement thwarted most attempts to 
bring 10b-5 class actions, because individual issues of reliance 
almost always eclipsed class-wide issues, preventing the action 
from moving forward under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3). The Court’s 4–2 decision in Basic, however, upended 
the existing individual-reliance regime and modified the private 
10b-5 action to allow securities-fraud class actions to proceed.  
See Note, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud 
Class Actions, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2019) (citations omitted). This is 
flat wrong. Even some securities scholars gloss over the overwhelming adop-
tion of fraud on the market in the lower courts prior to Basic: 
The complexity of the reliance issue became more apparent, 
however, when the Court returned to the issue fifteen years later. 
The logic of Affiliated Ute’s presumption of reliance did not 
cover affirmative misstatements, so the obstacle that reliance 
creates for class certification remained in those cases. The Court 

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absence of manipulation. Courts had long accepted the reliability 
of securities market pricing in other contexts, most notably share-
holder appraisal cases.52 In a 1948 decision of New York’s Appel-
late Division involving the appraisal of shares of R.H. Macy & 
Co., the court observed “that market value is the controlling 
consideration where there is a free and open market and the 
volume of transactions and conditions make the market a fair 
reflection of the judgment of the buying and selling public.”53 The 
idea was only that the market price reflected the thinking of a 
variety of investors about a variety of matters.54 As another New 
York opinion put it in 1952: “The bases for optimism and pessimism 
on the part of investors, and their reactions thereto, cause some 
to buy and others to sell. That is what creates a market, and the 

in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, urged on by the SEC, and with Justice 
Blackmun again writing for the majority, effectively completed 
the dismantling of the reliance requirement by adopting the 
‘fraud-on-the-market’ presumption of reliance. 
A.C. Pritchard, Halliburton II: A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 27, 33 (2015). Professor Fisch, among others, has pointed out this 
ongoing misunderstanding: 
Many commentators cite Basic as the foundation of modern 
securities fraud litigation. Basic did not reflect, however, a 
doctrinal shift. From the earliest cases addressing the implied 
private right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, the lower courts recog-
nized that it was impractical to impose a reliance requirement in 
federal securities fraud litigation. Commentators similarly ques-
tioned the theoretical premise for requiring proof of reliance. 
Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 900 (2013) (citations omitted). 
51 Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907–08 (9th Cir. 1975) stating the 
purchaser:  
relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly 
set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially in-
flated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the repre-
sentations underlying the stock price whether he is aware of it 
or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations. 
The Blackie court considered it “common sense that a stock purchaser does 
not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock.” 
Id. at 908. 
52 See Application of Marcus, 273 A.D. 725, 727 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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market measures the value where, as here, it is free and open.”55 
Bayless Manning would write in 1962 of shareholder appraisal ac-
tions that “courts have virtually refused to go beyond an inquiry 
as to the market price on the date determined to be relevant.”56 
 When the matter at hand became securities fraud under 
the Exchange Act instead of state law share appraisals57 and 

55 Application of Deutschmann, 281 A.D. 14, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952). In-
terestingly, it took some time for financial economists to begin serious study 
of such disagreement in financial markets. Early work on the topic includes: 
George M. Constantinides, Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous 
Consumers and without Demand Aggregation, 55 J. BUS. 253 (1982); Milton 
Harris & Artur Raviv, Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race, REV. FIN. 
STUD. 473 (1993); Mark Rubinstein, An Aggregation Theorem for Securities 
Markets, 1 J. FIN. ECON. 225 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Divergence of Opinion in 
Complete Markets: A Note, 40 J. FIN. 309 (1985). Much recent research focuses 
on disagreement and its effects in financial markets. See generally, e.g., Adem 
Atmaz & Suleyman Basak, Belief Dispersion in the Stock Market, 73 J. FIN. 
1225 (2018) (modeling belief dispersion and its impact on returns, volatility, 
and volume); Bruce I. Carlin, Francis A. Longstaff & Kyle Matoba, Disagree-
ment and Asset Prices, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 226 (2014) (studying the effect of differ-
ences of opinion on asset prices). Almost 25 years ago, Professor Stout argued 
for the importance of heterogeneous expectations in the legal understanding 
of securities markets. Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Dis-
agreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 
615–17 (1995). 
56 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for 
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 232 (1962). 
57 Interestingly, share appraisals today often reject market pricing in favor 
of a battle of experts with input from sitting judges as well, especially in 
Delaware where the use of market evidence has become nothing less than 
erratic. See, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 
210 A.3d 128, 140 (Del. 2019) (reversing lower court’s use of the unaffected 
pre-merger market price in favor of discounted cash flow valuation-based 
appraisal); Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 
A.3d 1, 24 (Del. 2017) (“Further, the Court of Chancery’s analysis ignored the 
efficient market hypothesis long endorsed by this Court. It teaches that the 
price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment 
of fair value than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert witness who 
caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled client.”); 
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 369–70 
(Del. 2017) (“Market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation 
techniques because, unlike, e.g., a single person’s discounted cash flow model, 
the market price should distill the collective judgment of the many based on 
all the publicly available information about a given company and the value of 
its shares.”); In re Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., No. CV 12080-CB, 2018 
WL 3625644, at *34 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018), judgment entered (Del. Ch. 

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courts sought a way to allow securities fraud plaintiffs to avail 
themselves of the class action procedure,58 all that was required 
for fraud on the market theory was a recognition that traders 
setting prices of securities at issue could be influenced by misin-
formation and, as a result, transact at prices reflecting the mis-
information.59 An early court used the term “[t]he artificially 
inflated market price theory”60 instead of “fraud on the market 

2018) (rejecting pre-merger announcement closing price as the best evidence 
of fair value of shares). 
58 The earliest cases allowing class actions did not consider the fraud on 
the market presumption but instead contemplated the possibility that the 
trial court could order individual trials on reliance. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf 
Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation omitted) (“We see no sound 
reason why the trial court, if it determines individual reliance is an essential 
element of the proof, cannot order separate trials on that particular issue, as 
on the question of damages, if necessary. The effective administration of 
23(b)(3) will often require the use of the ‘sensible device’ of split trials.”). 
59 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1111 (S.D. Tex. 1970) 
(characterizing fraud on the market as “a variety of ways and over a span of 
time the defendants concurred in wrongfully causing the market price of 
Westec stock on the American Stock Exchange to be higher than it would 
have been without such tortious conduct”). Commentators have traced judi-
cial openness to the fraud on the market presumption to the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private 
Actions Under Sec Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 592–93 (1975) (“Al-
though Affiliated Ute emphasized the nondisclosure aspects of that case, the 
case of a plaintiff damaged by the effect of a deception on the open market 
may also justify a presumption of reliance once the materiality of the decep-
tive practice is established. When a deception allegedly caused damage by 
means of its impersonal effect on a securities market, proof of causation re-
quires showing that the deception affected the market and that damage to 
the plaintiff resulted.”). The Affiliated Ute decision was quite different, how-
ever. There, the Supreme Court held that reliance was unnecessary in an 
omissions case if the facts would have been material to an investor. Affiliated 
Ute Citizens of Utah, 406 U.S. at 153–54. 
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a 
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequi-
site to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts with-
held be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might 
have considered them important in the making of this decision. 
Id. 
60 In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D. 443, 451 (S.D. Cal. 1974): 
The artificially inflated market price theory makes it unneces-
sary to prove that each investor relied on the same misrepre-
sentation. It is sufficient to show that there were different 
misrepresentations which were a part of a common scheme to 

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theory,” the former term better describing the nature of the cases 
by focusing on the incorrect price rather than anthropomorphizing 
the “market” as something capable of being defrauded like a per-
son.61 The price impact on a free and open public market—which 
then was embedded in the price at which plaintiffs traded—is 
thus more akin to manipulation than fraud.62 

manipulate the price of the stock. The facts of the instant case fit 
this theory. It may develop that there is some variance between 
misrepresentations, but the misrepresentations taken as a whole 
appear part of an uninterrupted manipulation of the price over 
the alleged class period. 
Id. See also Werfel v. Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing 
Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 1973)) (“Moreover, we 
doubt that proof of actual reliance, as in a common law action for deceit, is 
necessary in a 10b-5 action for damages. Rather, what plaintiff must show is 
causation.”); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elecs. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973) (citing Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the “Reasonable Investor” Rea-
sonable?, 72 COL. L. REV. 562, 576 (1972)) (“Demonstrating reliance in open 
market situations such as here should not be necessary. Plaintiffs should be 
required only to demonstrate a material misstatement by defendants.”). 
61 In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D. at 451. 
62 See, e.g., Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A 
Label in Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REV. 923, 950 (1988) (“Fraud on the 
market, in some cases, is used as a synonym for market manipulation. The 
statement that a trader is entitled to rely on the integrity of the market is the 
equivalent of saying that a trader may suffer injury when the market or price 
for a stock is tampered with. Accordingly, he may have a claim against dealers 
that created an artificial price and an artificial market.”); Norman S. Poser, 
Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 671, 716–17 (1986) (“It may be seen that the ‘fraud on the market’ 
theory is the first cousin, or possibly an even closer relative, of manipulation. 
Under both concepts, the causal line between the plaintiff’s harm and the defend-
ant’s wrongdoing is not actual reliance on the defendant’s deceptive acts, but 
damage to the free market.”); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 
v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1334 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub 
nom. S. Tr. Metals, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 
1464 (2019) (“Teasing out the effect of market conditions in fraud-on-the-
market cases is essential because the fraud alleged involves a manipulation 
of stock price.”). As a legal matter, however, market manipulation cases involve 
fraudulent transactions rather than misrepresentations. See Cellular S. Inc. v. 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 516 F. App’x 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted) (“A complaint that raises a market manipulation claim must 
allege ... manipulative acts .... ‘The gravamen of manipulation is deception of 
investors into believing that prices at which they purchase and sell securities 
are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by 
manipulators.’”). Securities fraud, as a concept, generates a number of other 
difficult-to-pin-down issues as well. For an analysis of many of these issues, 

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 The efficient markets hypothesis did not find its way into 
reported fraud on the market litigation until 1980.63 Just before, 
in a 1979 case arising under the Williams Act, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Seaboard World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Tiger International, Inc.,64 cited earlier case law for the prop-
osition that the stock market prices of a New York Stock Ex-
change–traded stock were usually the best reflection of the factors 
that influenced valuation.65 The court invoked the efficient markets 
hypothesis as further support for the reliability of such prices: 
Underlying such an approach is the “efficient market theory,” 
which, briefly stated, is that in a free and actively traded market, 
absent compelling reasons to believe otherwise, the market price 
is held to take account of asset value as well as the other eco-
nomic, political, and financial factors that determine “value.”66 
 
 A year later came the first reported opinion linking the 
fraud on the market theory with the efficient markets hypothe-
sis.67 In a 1980 opinion from the Northern District of Texas, In 
re LTV Securities Litigation,68 the district court invoked the efficient 
markets hypothesis to support the fraud on the market theory.69 
Fraud on the market—already the subject of more than a decade 

see Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 514–15 
(2011) (analyzing the nature of securities fraud). 
63 See In re LTV Sec. Litig, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980). See also 
Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation 2.0: An Essay in Honor of Don 
Langevoort, 107 GEO. L.J. 795, 798 (2019) (“The efficient market theory that 
financial economists began developing in the mid-twentieth century made its 
way into securities law discussions by the early 1980s.”). 
64 600 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1979). 
65 Id. (citing Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1246–47 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)). 
66 Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int’l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361–62 
(2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Cases taking the opposite view were rare. See, 
e.g., Jones v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 484 F. Supp. 679, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) (demonstrating where the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York largely rejected Seaboard’s embrace of stock market 
prices by allowing a mere expert affidavit from a Chartered Financial Ana-
lyst to create a fact issue as to whether the market value of the shares at 
issue—traded on the Pacific Stock Exchange—were reliable). 
67 See In re LTV Sec. Litig, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
68 Id. The LTV decision would heavily influence the United States Supreme 
Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988). 
69 Id. 
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of judicial approval—was reasonable as an empirical matter 
because “economists have now amassed sufficient empirical data 
to justify a present belief that widely followed securities of larger 
corporations are ‘efficiently’ priced: the market price of stocks 
reflects all available public information—and hence necessarily, 
any material misrepresentations as well.”70 
 This point is key: both of these courts—the Seaboard and 
LTV courts—invoked the efficient markets hypothesis to add weight 
to existing, sufficient precedent for accepting the reliability of 
securities prices in free and open public markets.71 Theirs was an 
appeal to the authority of a new social science of market efficiency 
to add heft to an already adequate argument.72 Securities mar-
ket prices were reliable not only because common sense and the 
day-to-day reliance of investors on such prices suggested as much, 
but because researchers in an increasingly prominent social sci-
ence said so.73 Moreover, those academic researchers were disin-
terested, with no stake in the securities jurisprudence or the 
cases at hand.74 
 Almost immediately, however, efficiency became more than 
an ancillary argument in favor of the reliability of securities prices. 
Soon, what started as an argument bolstering the reliability of 
securities market pricing effectively raised the bar on just how 

70 Id. at 144 (citing finance textbooks and a popular investment book). 
71 Cf. Henry T. C. Hu, Corporate Distress, Credit Default Swaps, and Defaults: 
Information and Traditional, Contingent, and Empty Creditors, 13 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 5, 9 (2018) (“In the 1970s, the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) provided a social science foundation for the disclosure philosophy.”). 
72 Efficient markets results entered legal commentary slowly at first. The 
first discussions of efficient market theory in law reviews appears to be Ste-
phen Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management 
Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 776 (1976) (“The 
obvious question raised by the efficient markets hypothesis is how legal doc-
trine should respond.”); B. Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 
80 YALE L.J. 1604, 1614 (1971) (analyzing suitability requirements in light of 
financial theory, including efficient markets theory); Walter Werner, Adven-
ture in Social Control of Finance: The National Market System for Securities, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1274 (1975) (“The term ‘efficient markets’ is generally 
employed by economists today to mean markets in which prices respond quickly 
to new information.”). 
73 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 72, at 1614. 
74 Id. 
438 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:417 
reliable that market pricing must be: it must be efficient.75 By 
1982, one district court would claim: “Critical to the fraud-on-the-
market theory is the assumption that market prices respond to 
information disseminated (or not disseminated).76 This is some-
times referred to as an efficient market.”77 Another would claim, 
citing the LTV decision, that the fraud-on-the-market theory “de-
rives from the concept of an efficient market, which concept is 
gaining judicial acceptance.”78 Both were misreadings of prior cases. 
 The fraud on the market theory had not required market 
efficiency in the sense that financial economists used the term, 
and it was certainly wrong as a historical matter that the pre-
sumption derived from that theory; the earliest cases were inde-
pendent of the social science. What was accurate was to say, as 
Professor Langevoort did in 1985, that “[o]ver the past decade, 
the courts have implicitly recognized the efficient market hy-
pothesis by adopting the ‘fraud on the market’ theory.”79 The 
idea of a free and open public market is different than the idea 
of an efficient market.80 The idea of a free and open market is, as 
said in the R.H. Macy & Co. appraisal decision, that “the volume of 
transactions and conditions make the market a fair reflection of 
the judgment of the buying and selling public.”81 This is far less 
demanding than market efficiency as financial economists use 
the term, where prices reflect the correct implications for security 
pricing of a particular subset of information.82 This subtlety was 
lost on the courts. 

75 As Professor Langevoort puts it well, “Efficiency-as-justification subtly 
becomes efficiency-as-prerequisite, an instance of the economic mode of discourse 
restricting, rather than expanding, the cognitive process of law-formulation.” 
Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market 
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 900–01 (1992). 
76 Fausett v. Am. Res. Mgmt. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (D. Utah 
1982) (citing 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 8.6 (1981)) (emphasis added). 
77 Id.  
78 McNichols v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 97 F.R.D. 331, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(citing In re LTV Sec. Litig, 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980)) (emphasis added). 
79 Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Se-
curities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 779 n.137 (1985) (emphasis added). 
80 See infra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
81 Application of Marcus, 273 A.D. 725, 727 (App. Div. 1948). 
82 See generally Jim Chappelow, Market Efficiency, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 29, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketefficiency.asp [https://per 
ma.cc/6B75-ANJQ]. 
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 As a result, in just about three years the fraud on the 
market theory was said to be “grounded on the assumption that 
the market price reflects all known material information.”83 A 
1984 opinion in the Southern District of New York held “that the 
‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory will only apply where the market 
concerned is an efficient one.”84 This shift in premise from a “free 
and open” market to an “efficient market” was advanced in part 
due to the surprising influence of a 1982 Harvard student Note.85 

83 T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irr. Fuel Auth., 717 
F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). See also Rosenberg v. 
Digilog Inc., 648 F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (citation omitted) (“The cen-
tral assumption of the theory is that the market price of a stock reflects all 
representations made by defendant with respect to that stock.”); Gibb v. 
Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59, 66 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (citation omitted) (“The 
theory assumes that market price reflects all known material information.”) 
Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 403 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (cita-
tion omitted) (“The fraud on the market theory, as applied to a developed 
securities market, assumes that the market price of stock reflects all availa-
ble public information, including material misrepresentations.”). 
84 Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (emphasis added). The cases cited here and immediately above show the 
error in Professor Korsmo’s claim that “[t]he FOTM doctrine, in pre-Basic judicial 
practice, plainly relied on the uncontroversial notion that stock prices reflect and 
respond to information in some fashion. Early decisions, however, rarely made 
mention of the ECMH and did not claim that the FOTM presumption would be 
appropriate only if markets were infallible.” Charles R. Korsmo, Market Effi-
ciency and Fraud on the Market: The Danger of Halliburton, 18 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 827, 837 (2014). He goes on to say, “I was able to find only a single 
district court opinion, In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142–45 (N.D. Tex. 
1980), discussing the ECMH in the context of the FOTM doctrine, pre-Basic.” 
Id. at 837 n.56. There were, in fact, many more cases following LTV. 
85 Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1143 
(1982). An equally insightful note was Michael A. Lynn, Fraud on the Market: 
An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under Sec Rule 10b-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 627 (1982) which was cited in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 
n.26 (1988). Other law review commentary to address the fraud on the market 
theory to that date did not mention market efficiency or the efficient markets 
concept. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982) (demon-
strating no mention of efficient markets in discussion of fraud on the market). 
The themes first developed in the Harvard Note were further developed later 
in Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reli-
ance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435 
(1984). Professor Black’s article took a stronger stand that market efficiency 
should be a prerequisite to the availability of the fraud on the market pre-
sumption and her article was cited by Justice White’s concurrence in part and 
dissent in part in Basic. Id. at 439; Basic, 485 U.S. at 254. 
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In Levinson v. Basic Inc.,86 the 1986 opinion of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that would so famously be 
taken up two years later by the Supreme Court, the court relied 
heavily on the Note’s characterization of the early case law in 
discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory.87 The court then turned 
to the Note’s view that “[t]he efficient-market hypothesis is the most 
persuasive rationale for adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory”88 
into an asserted third element necessary to invoke the theory, 
requiring “that the stock was traded on an efficient market[.]”89 
 Courts began to suggest they would require plaintiffs to 
prove not that a particular market was just free and open but 
that it was “efficient,”90 and most commentators accepted with-
out question the premise that the fraud on the market theory 
rested on the efficient markets hypothesis, not just free and open 
public markets.91 When the Supreme Court handed down Basic 

86 Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 
224 (1988). 
87 Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.26. 
88 Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, supra note 85, at 1161. 
89 Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485 
U.S. 224 (1988): 
In order to invoke the presumption of reliance based upon the 
fraud on the market theory, a plaintiff must allege and prove 
five elements. A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defend-
ants made public misrepresentations, ... (2) that the misrep-
resentations were material, (3) that the stock was traded on 
an efficient market, ... (4) that the misrepresentations would 
induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of 
the stock, ... and (5) that the plaintiff traded in the stock be-
tween the time the misrepresentations were made and the 
time the truth was revealed. 
Id. (citations omitted). The court cited to precedent for each of the enumerated 
elements, with the exception of the new third element, which the Court cited 
to the Harvard student Note. Id. (citing Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 
supra note 85, at 1161). 
90 A & J Deutscher Family Fund v. Bullard, No. CV-85-1850-PAR, 1987 
WL 16951, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1987) (citation omitted) (“Whether plain-
tiffs can show fraud-on-the-market—or put another way, whether the market 
in this stock is efficient—is itself a common question.”). 
91 See, e.g., Donald Eric Remensperger, Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market 
Actions—Investors’ Insurance in the Second Circuit?; Panzirer v. Wolf, 49 
BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1311 (1983) (“The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
(ECMH) provides the foundation for market fraud actions.”); Russell Robinson, 
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and Thinly-Traded Securities Under Rule 10b-5: 

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in 1988, the Court’s opinion retained some of the modesty of the 
fraud on the market decisions that, like LTV, appealed to the 
authority of the social science to support an arguably less oner-
ous requirement than efficiency in the sense meant in financial 
economics.92 But the Court said nothing to suggest that less-than-
efficiency would do, and, as set out above, the case on appeal 
had inserted the required element of efficiency.93 The efficiency 

How Does a Court Decide If a Stock Market Is Efficient?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 223, 251 (1990) (“But a showing of efficiency is important. Without such 
a showing, the fraud-on-the-market theory loses its validity as a substitute 
for reliance. Courts, therefore, must inquire into the nature of the security’s 
efficiency. This means the courts must ask questions about the process of infor-
mation regarding the security.”); Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regula-
tion and the Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 
1063, n. 158 (1987) (“The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis has been used 
as a basis for criticism and reformulation of legal policy in several areas. For 
example, it furnishes a key premise for the fraud on the market theory, under 
which the necessity to demonstrate reliance in rule 10b-5 actions (17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (1986)) is eliminated.”); Peter H. Wemple, Rule 10b-5 Securities 
Fraud: Regulating the Application of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory of 
Liability, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 733, 746 (1985) (“To protect an individual 
investor against fraud on efficient markets, the fraud-on-the-market theory 
does not require proof of actual reliance. Such a requirement would actually 
impede the purpose of securities laws to encourage market integrity.”). 
92 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988): 
The presumption is also supported by common sense and proba-
bility. Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress; 
premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed 
markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, 
any material misrepresentations. ... Because most publicly availa-
ble information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reli-
ance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may 
be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action. 
Id. 
93 Cf. Jill E. Fisch, The Future of Price Distortion in Federal Securities Fraud 
Litigation, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 91 (2015) (“Basic suggested 
that its analysis depended critically on market efficiency. This led subsequent 
courts to devote considerable effort to evaluating the extent to which the partic-
ular market in which a security traded was sufficiently efficient to justify the 
Basic presumption.”); Ann M. Lipton, Halliburton and the Dog That Didn’t Bark, 
10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (2015) (“Thus, after Basic, courts faced two 
conundrums: how open and developed must a market be before the fraud on 
the market doctrine is deemed to apply? And if such an open and developed mar-
ket exists, how ‘public’ and easily digestible must the information be before it is 

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requirement already developed in the lower courts gained more 
momentum. An efficiency inquiry became a shield for defendants.94 
B.Cammer v. Bloom 
 After Basic, defendants became more aggressive in chal-
lenging allegations that the securities at issue traded in an effi-
cient market.95 But how could a court determine if plaintiffs had 

presumed to have an impact? These are related questions—the more devel-
oped the market, the more likely it is that obscure information will influence 
stock prices—but the fraud on the market doctrine does not allow courts to (ex-
plicitly) adopt a sliding scale based on the interaction of market characteristics 
and statement prominence. As a result, courts answered the questions with, re-
spectively, ‘very,’ and (at least in some cases) ‘minimally.’”). 
94 As a procedural matter, it is plaintiff’s burden to establish entitlement 
to the fraud on the market presumption: The Basic presumption does not 
relieve plaintiffs of the burden of proving—before class certification—that 
this requirement is met. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Basic instead establishes 
that a plaintiff satisfies that burden by proving the prerequisites for invoking 
the presumption—namely, publicity, materiality, market efficiency, and market 
timing. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248–49. “The burden of proving those prerequisites 
still rests with plaintiffs and (with the exception of materiality) must be 
satisfied before class certification.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 276 (2014). Defendants can therefore challenge market 
efficiency before class certification. In addition, “defendants must be afforded 
an opportunity before class certification to defeat the presumption through 
evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the market 
price of the stock.” Id. at 284. 
95 See, e.g., Guenther v. Pac. Telecom, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 333, 339 (D. Or. 
1988) (“Defendants’ argument regarding the existence of an efficient market 
raises two issues: (1) Whether the determination of an efficient market is a 
proper issue to be resolved on a class certification motion; and (2) if it is, 
whether plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to support a finding of an 
efficient market.”); Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 
(D. Conn. 1988) (“The defendants contend that the plaintiffs should be pre-
cluded from utilizing that theory’s presumption of reliance because of the 
plaintiffs’ failure to prove an essential element of that theory—an ‘efficient’ 
market for Memory Metals stock.”); Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., No. 3-85-
1190, 1988 WL 146617, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 1988) (“Defendants argue 
that plaintiff cannot establish an ‘efficient’ market for first issue bonds be-
cause the bond’s price does not reflect all available public information about 
the economy, financial markets, and the specific company involved.”); In re 
Tech. Equities Fed. Sec. Litig., No. C-86-20157(A) WAI, 1988 WL 147607, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1988) (“Defendants argue that the principle of ‘fraud on 
the market’ cannot be applied with respect to reliance unless there exists an 

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adequately alleged an efficient market? In 1989, a district judge 
sitting in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey took up the challenge.96 Cammer v. Bloom presented 
the question whether securities alleged to have traded in the 
NASDAQ over-the-counter market traded in an efficient mar-
ket.97 The auditor defendant argued “that only stocks trading on 
either the New York or American stock exchanges should be 
eligible for fraud on the market treatment.”98 Observing that the 
auditor defendant sought “to have important distinctions drawn 
based upon subtle differences between the trading atmospheres 
at the national exchanges and the over-the-counter market[,]”99 
the court properly recognized “no reasoned precedent for such 
distinctions.”100 
 The court then sets off on a narrative frolic—free of cita-
tion to research from the social sciences—of ad hoc suggestions 
for alleging an efficient market.101 Relying on a plaintiffs’ expert 
affidavit offered to help salvage the eighteenth draft of an 
amended complaint,102 as well as a securities treatise,103 the court 

open, well developed and efficient market. They maintain that no such mar-
ket existed for Technical Equities securities.”); Harman v. LyphoMed, Inc., 
122 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“Defendants try to distinguish Basic. 
They note that LyphoMed stock is traded over the counter, and that the fraud 
on the market theory does not apply to such securities.”). 
96 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1264–65 (D.N.J. 1989). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1280. 
99 Id. at 1283. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1284–85. 
102 Id. at 1278. 
While the Amended Complaint—which is the product of twen-
ty-nine capable law firms collaborating on essentially the 
eighteenth draft—is void of facts which would support the in-
vocation of the fraud on the market theory, plaintiffs have be-
latedly submitted the Poser Affidavit and numerous other 
submissions which, they argue, amply demonstrate the effi-
ciency of the market. 
Id. 
103 Wendy Gerwick Couture, Professor Alan R. Bromberg and the Scholarly 
Role of the Treatise, 68 SMU L. REV. 703, 710 (2015). 
In April 1989, Judge Alfred James Lechner, Jr., in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, issued 

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offered its opinion on how to determine if securities at issue 
traded in an efficient market.104 Whether or not the securities 
traded on a national exchange was not determinative.105 But 
being qualified to file the SEC’s Form S-3 was “an important 
factor weighing in favor of a finding that a market is effi-
cient.”106 The Cammer court claimed that “an average weekly 
trading volume during the class period in excess of a certain 
number of shares” could be probative of efficiency.107 In addition, 
it “would be persuasive to allege a significant number of securi-
ties analysts followed and reported on a company’s stock during 
the class period” since “[t]he existence of such analysts would 
imply” that the auditor defendant’s reports “were closely re-
viewed by investment professionals, who would in turn make 

Cammer v. Bloom, one of the first opinions to complete an in-
depth analysis of Basic’s application, and he cited Professor 
Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels’ treatise nine times, quoting 
from it extensively. First, he adopted their definition of mar-
ket efficiency. Second, he agreed with them that market effi-
ciency must be determined on an individualized basis. Third, 
he identified a series of factors (the so-called Cammer factors) 
that courts should consider when analyzing whether the mar-
ket for a particular security was efficient .... Judge Lechner 
relied on Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels’ guidance in 
crafting four of these five factors. 
Id. 
104 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1281. 
105 Id.  
It would be illogical to apply a presumption of reliance merely 
because a security is traded within a certain ‘whole market’, 
without considering the trading characteristics of the individ-
ual stock itself. Some well-followed stocks, such as Apple 
Computer and MCI Telecommunications, have chosen to 
trade in the over-the-counter market rather than on a national 
exchange. On the other hand, some companies listed on na-
tional stock exchanges are relatively unknown and trade 
there only because they met the eligibility requirements. 
While the location of where a stock trades might be relevant, 
it is not dispositive of whether the ‘current price reflects all 
available information.’ 
Id. 
106 Id. at 1285. 
107 Id. at 1286. 
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buy/sell recommendations to client investors.”108 Having “numer-
ous market makers”109 would make efficiency more likely since 
“[t]he existence of market makers and arbitrageurs would en-
sure completion of the market mechanism; these individuals 
would react swiftly to company news and reported financial re-
sults by buying or selling stock and driving it to a changed price 
level.”110 Finally, the court stated: 
it would be helpful to a plaintiff seeking to allege an efficient 
market to allege empirical facts showing a cause and effect re-
lationship between unexpected corporate events or financial 
releases and an immediate response in the stock price. This, 
after all, is the essence of an efficient market and the founda-
tion for the fraud on the market theory.111 
 
 Professors Gordon and Kornhauser had warned four years 
before Cammer that “the ability to test for market efficiency is 
subject to question. Virtually none of this doubt, however, has 
been reflected in the debates about the implications of the efficient 
market hypothesis for legal decision making.”112 Consistent with 
their caution, the Cammer court expressed no doubt about its 
proposals for alleging (and presumably proving) market efficiency 
for securities at issue.113 With considerable judicial hubris, the 
Cammer court asserted that the answer to the question “Efficient 
or not?” had answers in data about the type of SEC form an issuer 
was entitled to use, the amount of weekly volume, the number of 
securities analysts covering the security, the number of market 
makers in the stock, and a quantification of price reactions to 
events to show responsiveness to information.114 None of these 




110 Id. at 1286–87. 
111 Id. at 1287. 
112 Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly In-
formation, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 765 (1985). 
113 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1264–65. 
114 Id. at 1286–87. 
115 See generally Daniel Liberto, Financial Economics, Investopedia (Sept. 29, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-economics.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/VF6B-4RLE]. 
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C.The Consequences of Cammer 
 By virtue of offering an answer, any answer, to a pressing 
question, Cammer, as the first mover, immediately influenced 
courts throughout the country.116 Courts cited Cammer for its 
plan of “a detailed inquiry into whether the market for the stock 
is sufficiently active for the pricing mechanism to function and, 
a priori, capable of being affected by the fraud.”117 Plaintiffs who 
failed to allege these indicia of efficiency were thrown out by 
courts citing Cammer.118 Within a year, a district judge sitting 
on the United States District Court for the District of Oklahoma 
would cite Cammer for which “factors might be examined to de-
termine a market’s efficiency.”119 The term stuck. Soon the 

116 See Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 107 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We take note 
of the thorough analysis in Cammer ... where the district court, in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, considered whether 
plaintiffs’ affidavit showed ‘specific fact’ indicating an efficient market.”); In 
re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1991) 
(“Not only do Plaintiffs specifically state that the market was efficient, but 
they also set forth several of the indicia of a well-developed, efficient market 
mentioned in Cammer. Accordingly, at least at this juncture in the proceedings, 
the plaintiffs in Feld may proceed on the fraud on the market theory of presumed 
reliance.”); Greenberg v. Boettcher & Co., 755 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Ill. 
1991) (“In Cammer ... the court listed examples of allegations helpful in meet-
ing the efficient market requirement.”); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 
F. Supp. 785, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (“In the absence of Ninth Circuit authority, 
the court finds that the Cammer criteria are helpful in determining whether 
the market is efficient.”); Stinson v. Van Valley Dev. Corp., 719 F. Supp. 362, 
363 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1274–75) (“In Cam-
mer ... the court offered the following indicia of market efficiency sufficient to 
satisfy this threshold: (1) sufficient weekly trading volume, (2) reports and 
analysis by investment professionals, (3) market makers and arbitragers, (4) 
eligibility to file S-3 Registration Statement, and (5) historical showing of 
immediate price response to unexpected events or financial releases.”). 
117 In re Bexar Cty. Health Facility Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 602, 
607 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
118 Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264, 1289 (D.N.J. 1990) 
(citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87) (“In this case, the Plaintiffs have 
failed to allege or present facts sufficient to raise the inference that Hughes 
Capital securities were traded on an open and developed market.”). 
119 Kelley v. Mid-Am. Racing Stables, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 405, 409 (W.D. 
Okla. 1990) (emphasis added). 
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“Cammer factors” were the benchmark test for market efficiency.120 
Defendants argued that a plaintiff must allege all five of the 
Cammer factors,121 and some courts suggested the same.122 One 

120 Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(“The court in Cammer identified five factors that would be useful in proving 
that a security was traded in an efficient market ....”); Simpson v. Specialty 
Retail Concepts, 823 F. Supp. 353, 354 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (“This court finds the 
Cammer factors instructive and will follow its lead.”). 
121 See In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. 91-20084 SW, 1991 
WL 253003, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1991) (quoting Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 
at 1285–86) (“Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ allegation of an efficient mar-
ket is deficient because it is not supported by specific allegations of the five 
types of facts mentioned in Cammer .... However, the Cammer court did not 
hold that the plaintiff must allege all five types of facts in order to establish 
that the market was open and efficient. The court simply stated that ‘[t]here 
are several types of facts which, if alleged, might give rise to an inference 
that [the defendant] traded in an efficient market.’ By listing five types of 
facts, the court was merely suggesting possible ways of alleging the existence 
of an open and efficient market. The court did not attempt to delineate the 
minimum pleading requirements.”). 
122 See, e.g., Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2005) (cit-
ing Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 475 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Binder v. 
Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 
at 1286–87) (“The Cammer factors are designed to help make the central 
determination of efficiency in a particular market. They address five charac-
teristics of the company and its stock: first, whether the stock trades at a 
high weekly volume; second, whether securities analysts follow and report on 
the stock; third, whether the stock has market makers and arbitrageurs; 
fourth, whether the company is eligible to file SEC registration form S-3, as 
opposed to form S-1 or S-2; and fifth, whether there are ‘empirical facts show-
ing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or 
financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price.’ ... The dis-
trict court determined that Binder offered evidence only as to the presence of 
market makers and arbitrageurs. We agree with the district court that this 
factor alone is insufficient as a matter of law to deem the market for AVBC 
stock efficient. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s decision to decertify the 
class through December 1993.”); In re Surebeam Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV 
1721JM(POR), 2005 WL 5036360, at *24 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2005) (“Because 
both parties agree that the Cammer factors should determine fraud on the 
market and Plaintiff has not addressed any of the Cammer factors, the Com-
plaint does not adequately plead reliance through the fraud-on-the-market 
theory. Similarly, the Complaint does not set out any factors that would 
indicate direct reliance on the misstatements, so reliance is inadequately 
pled.”); Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, 906 F. Supp. 1470, 1481 (D. Utah 1994), 
aff’d, 69 F.3d 547 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (“Plaintiffs, without alleging 
trading volume, plead the pure legal conclusion that Global had an efficient 
and well developed market for its stock. In support of that conclusion, plaintiffs 

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court found the fraud on the market theory was “particularly 
applicable to a large national market such as the NYSE”123 be-
cause the Cammer factors fit such a market well, a preposterous 
example of the legal tail wagging the real-world dog; surely we 
did not need the Cammer factors to tell us that the fraud on the 
market presumption was suited to NYSE stocks.124  

allege that five of the plaintiffs had this ‘impression’ ‘based on the existence 
of up to fourteen separate market makers during the class period.’ No allega-
tions suggest that these market makers were actually misled or otherwise 
misunderstood Global’s situation in any way or otherwise link them with the 
dates of plaintiffs’ market purchases. No allegations show active trading at 
any time by the market makers. The volume of the market for Global shares 
is not alleged. There is no allegation that Global enjoyed the status of being a 
Form S-3 registrant. Additionally, the allegations of penny market prices, 
inconsistent financial statements, off market transactions at off market prices, 
all demonstrate that Global’s market does not meet the requirements set 
forth in Basic .... Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate where 
there are inadequate factual allegations to show an efficient, developed mar-
ket.”); Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 799, 804 (D. Colo. 1993) (citing 
Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87 (“The fraud-on-the-market theory requires 
showing that the security was traded in large volume during the time period 
at issue, that a significant number of securities’ analysts followed and report-
ed on the security and that the price changed in relation to public statements 
or reports about the activities of the issuer.”); Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–
87) (“Similarly, the court failed to evaluate the significance of the market-
efficiency factors lacking in the instant case. For instance, the number of 
securities analysts following the stock is an important factor .... Hence, the 
fact that no analyst was reporting on Amedisys stock at the time in question 
should have been weighed against the rather scant utility of, for example, the 
number of ‘market makers.’ Further, the court did not address the effect on 
the market efficiency determination of Amedisys’s ineligibility to file an SEC 
Form S-3 at the time in question (the other factor absent in this case). Be-
cause Rule 23 mandates a complete analysis of ‘fraud on the market’ indica-
tors, district courts must address and weigh factors both for and against 
market efficiency.”). 
123 In re Laidlaw Sec. Litig., No. 91-CV-1829, 1992 WL 68341, at *10 n.8 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1992) (citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1264; Freeman v. 
Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
124 Some decisions of the district courts are nearly impossible to square 
with the evidence that stock traded in an efficient market. See Charles W. 
Murdock, Halliburton, Basic, and Fraud on the Market: The Need for A New 
Paradigm, 60 VILL. L. REV. 203, 229 (2015) (suggesting “a lack of objectivity 
and an outcome determinative mentality from the court” in the outcome of In 
re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2006), a case 
with strong facts demonstrating efficiency that the court unconvincingly 
characterized as “weak”). 
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A decade or so after Cammer, the influence of the factors 
reached a more absurd level, with courts engaged in “angels on 
the head of a pin” scrutiny of which and how many Cammer factors 
were sufficient: 
 
While it is clear that satisfaction of only one Cammer factor is 
not sufficient as a matter of law to prove the existence of an 
efficient market, it appears no case has addressed how many 
Cammer factors must be alleged to plead reliance under a 
fraud-on-the-market theory. Reviewing plaintiffs’ allegations 
in this case, the court concludes that pleading two of the five 
factors is not sufficient .... Plaintiffs have not only failed to 
plead a majority of the factors, but ... [the issuer] files a Form 
S-1, not a Form S-3, registration statement. For these reasons, 
the court finds that plaintiffs have not alleged reliance under 
a fraud-on-the-market theory with sufficient particularity.125 
 
When additional factors were added to the list, the com-
binations exploded. There were 31 possible combinations of five 
factors; there were 255 combinations of eight factors. Decisions be-
gan to vary erratically.126 Defendants focused in on the Cammer 
fifth factor—a history of immediate stock price movements in re-
sponse to unexpected corporate events and financial releases—
because that factor was the junkiest of all, susceptible to the 
worst of arguments that the market for a security at issue was 
inefficient.127 It was (and remains) an expert witness’s dream. It 
was also (and remains) hogwash. 

125 In re Turbodyne Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV9900697MMMBQRX, 
2000 WL 33961193, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2000) (citations omitted). The 
court noted that “[a]ssuming plaintiffs can plead additional Cammer factors, 
it is not clear that the fact Turbodyne files a Form S-1 precludes a finding 
that its stock trades in an efficient market.” Id. at *14 n.108. 
126 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving Markets Inefficient: The Varia-
bility of Federal Court Decisions on Market Efficiency in Cammer v. Bloom 
and Its Progeny, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 303, 305 (2002) (“I suggest that 
while the courts in question may appear to be sufficiently sophisticated to 
discern the level of efficiency in a securities market, in fact they are not. The 
courts embrace a laundry list of factors economists have suggested as indica-
tors of market efficiency, but fail to show an aptitude for considering these 
factors in a deeper, contextual fashion.”). See also David Tabak, Counting 
Cammer Factors—A Review of Case Law, LAW360 (Aug. 30, 2012), https:// 
www.law360.com/articles/372672/counting-cammer-factors-a-review-of-case-law 
[https://perma.cc/R2EV-3TER]. 
127 See, e.g., In re Sci.-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1339 
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (citations omitted) (“In support of that position, Defendants 

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II.CAMMER IS JUNK SCIENCE 
A.How Financial Economists Test for Efficiency: (Tradeable) 
Predictable Returns 
 Market efficiency128 is one of those concepts that is in one 
sense easy to understand while remaining rather technical. 

rely on the affidavit of their expert, Dr. Cox, who conducted an ‘event study’ 
which analyzed the effect of 20 allegedly fraudulent statements identified in 
the Complaint on the market price of SA stock. According to Dr. Cox, the 
results of his event study did not show statistically significant positive stock 
price movement in response to these allegedly fraudulent statements. Based 
on these results, he opines that ‘[t]he Complaint’s efficiency claim is incon-
sistent with its allegations of material false and misleading statements.’”); 
O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (“[Plaintiff’s expert] 
attempted to show instances of a fall in the price of [the] stock in response to 
the dissemination of adverse information. [Defendant’s expert] demonstrated, 
however, that within days thereafter, the price rose almost to its original 
level, without any dissemination of ‘good news’ that could account for the 
increase.”). This practice continues. See, e.g., Monroe Cty. Employees’ Ret. 
Sys. v. S. Co., No. 1:17-CV-00241-WMR, 2019 WL 2482399, at *5 (N.D. Ga. 
June 12, 2019) (“Plaintiffs note that Dr. Gompers testified that he only con-
sidered the fifth Cammer factor when evaluating market efficiency. Plaintiffs 
contend that by refusing to even consider the other factors, Dr. Gompers’ 
opinion is not only inconsistent with binding legal authority, but also that it 
is unreliable as it is based on a biased, cherry-picked review of the record 
that ignores all contrary evidence.”). The strategy still comes close to working 
with courts who do not understand (as explained further below) that statisti-
cal significance is meaningless in determining market efficiency under the fifth 
Cammer factor. See, e.g., Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 328 
F.R.D. 86, 96–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[Defendant] Och-Ziff argues that [plain-
tiff’s expert] Dr. Nye’s data failed to show that the stock price actually reacted 
to news events. Whereas only 5% of a random sampling of days is expected to 
produce statistically significant price movement, Dr. Nye found statistically 
significant price movement in the days following eight of the seventeen news 
events—or 47.1%. Och-Ziff argues that this is too low a percentage. This is 
perhaps Och-Ziff’s strongest argument. While Nye’s event study still shows a 
significant cause-and-effect relationship between news events and price move-
ment, this objection nevertheless weakens the Nye Report’s persuasive force.”) 
(citations omitted); City of Cape Coral Mun. Firefighters’ Ret. Plan v. Emer-
gent Biosolutions, Inc., HQ, 322 F. Supp. 3d 676, 687 (D. Md. 2018) (“Defend-
ants only challenge Lead Plaintiffs’ conclusion that the fifth, empirical Cammer 
factor cuts in favor of market efficiency in this case.”). 
128 This Article is concerned with informational efficiency: the idea that 
prices fully reflect a given subset of information. On its own, this says nothing 

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Lawyers without formal training in its theoretical underpinnings 
and its relation to the rest of financial economics have consist-
ently struggled as a result. It is not true, for example, that “[a]n 
efficient capital market is one in which the current price of a 
security is the best estimate of what the price of that security 
will be in the future”129 because, among other reasons, future 
prices can be efficient but be expected to increase by the return 
required in equilibrium.130 It is true that “[s]ecurities that trade 
in efficient markets have rapid price adjustments to new infor-
mation[,]”131 one way to shorthand the theory. But even this is 

about the “allocational efficiency” of the stock market, that is, whether the 
stock market does a good job of drawing capital into socially optimal pursuits. 
The assumption that market efficiency is an important social goal is due 
partly to the assumption that efficient prices facilitate allocative efficiency. 
See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock 
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 980 (1992) (analyzing allocative mistakes, among other 
social costs of inefficient prices); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being 
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regu-
lation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 616 (1988) (noting one assumption “necessary to 
the view that improving market efficiency is an important goal of securities 
regulation ... is that accurate stock prices are desirable because stock market 
prices influence the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and 
services in the economy.”). Importantly, that which improves informational 
efficiency can lead to poor allocative efficiency, see Yesha Yadav, How Algo-
rithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1607, 1670 (2015), and presumably vice versa. Professor Yadav makes a 
strong argument for potential allocative inefficiencies of high-frequency trad-
ing even as most research suggests (and Professor Yadav acknowledges) that 
high-frequency trading improves informational efficiency. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott, & Ryan Riordan, High-Frequency Trading and 
Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267, 2303–04 (2014) (demonstrating that 
the trading patterns of high-frequency traders are suggestive of information-
ally efficient trading). 
129 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Econom-
ics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 
1076 (1990) (citing Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Secu-
rities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 n.9 
(1982)). Neither Macey, Miller, nor Fischel are trained financial economists. 
130 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970) (describing next period’s price in 
terms of an equilibrium expected return model). 
131 Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Measuring Securities Market Ef-
ficiency in the Regulatory Setting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 106 (2000). 
The rest of the quote is inaccurate, however: “... whereas those in inefficient 

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an “if A, then B” logic that must be used with care: if a security 
trades in an efficient market, then it has a rapid price adjust-
ment to new information. It is, of course, a basic logical fallacy to 
argue from there that “if B, then A,” that is, if a security has a 
rapid price adjustment to new information, then it trades in an 
efficient market. The adjustment could be rapid but very wrong. 
 The best starting place for understanding the efficient 
markets hypothesis remains Professor Fama’s 1970 review arti-
cle,132 where he observes that “[a]ll empirical research on the 
theory of efficient markets has been concerned with whether 
prices ‘fully reflect’ particular subsets of available information.”133 
Both parts of this concern are important to understand.134 “Fully 
reflect” means that the information under study cannot be used 
to earn superior risk-adjusted returns.135 “Particular subsets” is 
important as well.136 A test must specify the information that is 
hypothesized to be fully reflected in the price.137 One can cer-
tainly hypothesize that the prior history of prices is fully reflected 

markets do not.” Prices could, of course, react quickly but highly inaccurately 
when news is released. 
132 Fama, supra note 130, at 383. As of 2006, this was the 20th most-cited 
article in all of economics since 1970. E. Han Kim, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, 
What Has Mattered to Economics Since 1970, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189, 
193 (2006). 
133 Fama, supra note 130, at 388. Of course, prices will likely reflect only 
the information that is worth acquiring on the margin. See Eugene F. Fama, 
Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991) (citing Michael C. 
Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 
95 (1978)) (“A weaker and economically more sensible version of the efficiency 
hypothesis says that prices reflect information to the point where the mar-
ginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed 
the marginal costs.”). 
134 See Fama, supra note 130, at 388. 
135 See id. at 388, 413–14. It is important to note that the question is almost 
always whether the information can be used to generate superior returns, not 
whether the price is fundamentally “correct.” Because the existence of superior 
returns requires positing some model of how returns are generated, however, 
there is a link to models of market equilibrium that are, in essence, models of 
how assets should be priced if the assumptions of the model hold. 
136 A formal and precise exposition of this concept is Mark Latham, Informa-
tional Efficiency and Information Subsets, 41 J. FIN. 39, 39–41 (1986) (presenting a 
formalization of Fama’s notion of efficiency with respect to subsets of information). 
137 See id. at 39.  
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in the price (called “weak-form efficiency”),138 that all publicly 
available information is reflected in the price (called “semi-
strong form efficiency”),139 or that all information—private as 
well—is reflected in price (called “strong-form efficiency”).140 But 
in all cases, the testing of that hypothesis requires the identifica-
tion of the subset of information that is assumed under the hy-
pothesis to be available to the market.141 This has long been a 
source of considerable difficulty in practice.142 
 Nevertheless, there is one test that nearly all financial econ-
omists agree on,143 even if its application in specific situations 
can be controversial.144 That is a test for the short-run tradeable 

138 Id. at 39–41. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 See id. at 40. 
142 See Daniel Friedman, Glenn W. Harrison & Jon W. Salmon, The Informa-
tional Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 349, 350 
(1984) (“A fundamental difficulty in devising any test of such general efficient 
market hypotheses, however, is the specification of the relevant public and private 
information sets of traders. Without a consensus as to reasonable empirical 
specifications, tests of the hypotheses remain minimal or controversial.”). 
143 There are many tests of market efficiency where financial economists 
do not even agree that the test is capable of distinguishing efficient from 
inefficient prices. See generally Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too 
Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 
421, 433–34 (1981). The best known of these are tests of whether stocks are 
too volatile to be consistent with ex post cash flows (dividends) to stocks. See 
generally id. Such tests are directed more at whether prices reflect a particular 
view of fundamental value than the reaction of prices to information. See id. 
(arguing that the variance of stock prices is inconsistent with the present value 
model of future dividends); Stephen F. LeRoy & Richard D. Porter, The Present-
Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds, 49 ECONOMETRICA 
555, 559 (1981) (similar); Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficiency and the Variability of 
Asset Prices, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 183, 184–85 (1984) (arguing against the 
interpretation of market inefficiency); Terry A. Marsh & Robert C. Merton, 
Dividend Variability and Variance Bounds Tests for the Rationality of Stock 
Market Prices, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 483, 483–84 (1986) (criticizing the reliabil-
ity of variance-bounds tests of market efficiency); Robert J. Shiller, The Use of 
Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Efficiency, 36 J. FIN. 291–92 (1981) 
(defending use of volatility measures to judge market efficiency). 
144 See, e.g., John M. Griffin, Patrick J. Kelly & Federico Nardari, Do Market 
Efficiency Measures Yield Correct Inferences? A Comparison of Developed and 
Emerging Markets, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3225, 3226 (2010). 
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(that is, potentially profitable, after trading costs) predictability 
of stock returns, whether the predictor is some feature of the time-
series of past prices or some non-price information like an earn-
ings announcement.145 The presence of such predictable returns 
would suggest that traders could earn superior risk-adjusted re-
turns by investing in the securities under test.146 Indeed, the theory 
of market efficiency has its roots in the empirical fact that early 
researchers determined that stock price changes for individual 
stocks were essentially unpredictable, and therefore, untradeable 
in a consistently profitable way.147 In his groundbreaking article, 
The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices,148 Eugene F. Fama pre-
sented the strongest evidence to that date that the past history 
of an individual stock’s returns was not useful in predicting 
stock returns.149 He characterized his results as “consistent with 
the existence of an ‘efficient’ market for securities, that is, a mar-
ket where, given the available information, actual prices at every 

145 See, e.g., id. (testing efficiency “in terms of a) a practical notion of efficiency: 
the returns to trading strategies based on past returns and earnings announce-
ments; and b) the deviations prices exhibit from the random walk paradigm.”). 
146 See Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1583, 1583–84 (1989) (“It is only differences in information—infor-
mation that is not ‘fully reflected’ in prices—that confer comparative ad-
vantage, and that therefore can form the basis for profitable trading rules.”). 
147 See Fama, supra note 130, at 383 (“Though we proceed from theory to 
empirical work, to keep the proper historical perspective we should note that 
to a large extent the empirical work in this area preceded the development of 
the theory.”). The unpredictability of prices appears first to have been set out 
by Louis Bachelier, The Theory of Speculation (A. James Boness, trans.), in 
THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK PRICES (Paul H. Cootner, ed.). Fama’s 
work also benefited from the insights of Maurice G. Kendall, The Analysis of 
Economic Time-Series, Part I: Prices, 116 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 11 (1953) (pre-
senting empirical evidence of a random walk in indices of stock prices); and 
M.F.M. Osborne, Brownian Motion in the Stock Market, 7 OPERATIONS RES. 
145 (1959) (documenting random walks in individual stocks); Holbrook Work-
ing, The Investigation of Economic Expectations, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 150, 
159–60 (1949) (setting out reasons why changes in futures prices should be 
“completely unpredictable”). 
148 Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965). 
149 Professor Fama studied the 30 stocks that comprised the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. Id. at 45. See also Eugene F. Fama & Marshall E. Blume, 
Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading, 39 J. BUS. 226, 240 (1966) (conclud-
ing “that our results add further to the evidence that for practical purposes 
the random-walk model is an adequate description of price behavior.”). 
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point in time represent very good estimates of intrinsic values.”150 
Such weak-form efficiency is virtually never rejected in any free 
and open public market. By comparison to the Cammer factors 
discussed below, the examination of returns for predictability is 
mostly a matter of applying accepted methodology correctly and 
accounting for measurement error and transactions costs (so as 
not to suggests tradeable predictability where it does not exist).151 
 Empirical results on the lack of tradeable short-run pre-
dictable returns are consistent with—and help explain—findings 
on the inability of professionals to beat the market.152 The first 
well-known study of the ability of professionals to find mispriced 
securities was by Alfred Cowles, published in 1933 in Economet-
rica.153 Cowles found that “the most successful records are little, 
if any, better than what might be expected to result from pure 
chance.”154 Additional tests began in earnest in the mid-1960s. 
For example, Professor William F. Sharpe (who would go on to 
share the Nobel Prize in Economics for the development of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model) published his paper, Mutual Fund 
Performance,155 in 1966, finding support for “the view that the 
capital market is highly efficient and that good [mutual fund] 

150 Fama, supra note 148, at 90 (emphasis in original). 
151 See, e.g., Hendrik Bessembinder & Kalok Chan, Market Efficiency and 
the Returns to Technical Analysis, 27 FIN. MGMT. 5 (1998) (documenting 
measurement error and lack of robustness to trading costs of simple technical 
trading rules). Given the wide acceptance of weak-form efficiency as the most 
basic requirement of market efficiency, it is ironic that one court that consid-
ered the Cammer factors refused to consider evidence of a random walk, 
presumably because the expert and/or the counsel did a very poor job of ex-
plaining the analysis. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-159, 
2002 WL 32076175, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) (“[The expert] asserts 
that the ‘relationship between market efficiency and the random walk char-
acter of price changes is well-recognized in the economics and finance litera-
ture’ and ‘has testable implications.’ [citation to affidavit]. However, Plaintiffs 
have provided no specific instances where the relationship is recognized.”). 
152 See Alfred Cowles, Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?, 1 ECONOMET-
RICA 309, 324 (1933); William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. 
BUS. 119, 138 (1966) (illustrating that professionals evaluate risk and diver-
sity rather than trying to beat the market).  
153 Cowles, supra note 152, at 309. 
154 Id. at 324. 
155 Sharpe, supra note 152, at 119. 
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managers concentrate on evaluating risk and providing diversi-
fication, spending little effort (and money) on the search for in-
correctly priced securities.”156 In his 1968 study,157 Professor 
Michael C. Jensen found similar evidence.158 Subsequent decades 
have witnessed the mounting of evidence against the ability of 
active investors to beat the apparently efficient securities mar-
kets. Passive index funds continue to beat active equity manag-
ers.159 This inability of professional money managers to beat 
passive benchmarks is, for many, highly persuasive evidence of 
market efficiency.160 

156 Id. at 138. 
157 Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 
1945–1964, 23 J. FIN. 389 (1968). 
158 Id. at 415. 
159 Daisy Maxey & Chris Dieterich, Indexes Beat Stock Pickers Even Over 15 
Years, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/indexes-beat 
-stock-pickers-even-over-15-years-1492039859 [https://perma.cc/QX47-476Z]; 
Chris Newlands & Madison Marriage, 99% of Actively Managed US Equity 
Funds Underperform, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content 
/e139d940-977d-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582 [https://perma.cc/3VFU-6EDL] Accu-
mulated evidence of underperformance by active managers has generated a 
massive shift to passive investing. See, e.g., Kate Beioley, US active funds suffer 
record $143bn “exodus” in December, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www 
.ft.com/content/4b863bbe-1a7a-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21; Corrie Driebusch, In-
vestors Pulling More Money From Actively Managed U.S. Stock Funds, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-pulling-more-money 
-from-actively-managed-u-s-stock-funds-1452702638 [https://perma.cc/76D5 
-7VAX]; Chris Flood, Vanguard Retains Title as World’s Fastest-Growing Asset 
Manager, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/753e1afe-f149 
-11e7-ac08-07c3086a2625 [https://perma.cc/W4D2-HMWL]; Attracta Mooney, 
Passive Funds Grew 4.5 Times Faster Than Active in 2016, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 12, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c4f6ee56-e48c-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a [https:// 
perma.cc/C9QB-R5J9]. 
160 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Two Pillars of Asset Pricing, 104 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1467, 1482 (2014) (“However one judges market efficiency, it has moti-
vated a massive body of empirical work that has enhanced our understanding 
of markets, and, like it or not, professional money managers have to address 
its challenges.”); Stanley J. Kon & Frank C. Jen, The Investment Performance 
of Mutual Funds: An Empirical Investigation of Timing, Selectivity, and Market 
Efficiency, 52 J. BUS. 263, 263 (1979) (observing that Jensen’s mutual fund 
studies “have been cited as support for the strong form of the Efficient Mar-
kets Hypothesis (EMH); that is, whether any investor has monopolistic access 
to any information relevant for price formation”). 
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 While market efficiency remains the subject of ongoing 
research in financial economics,161 it is crucial to acknowledge 
that financial economists virtually never test, as litigants do, 
whether the pricing of a single stock is efficient.162 The reason is 
more or less the same as the reasons Alon Brav and I gave for 
the glaring difference between single-firm event studies in secu-
rities litigation and the multi-firm event studies used in academic 
research163: single-firm tests have extremely low statistical pow-
er and the ability to predict single-firm returns is very poor.164 
For this reason, financial economists look for evidence of ineffi-
ciency by studying many firms, usually in portfolios, to increase 
the statistical power of their tests.165 Second, and relatedly, by 
using more powerful tests on portfolios of many firms, evidence 
of inefficiencies such as this that are (arguably) found can have 

161 See, e.g., Shmuel Baruch, Marios Panayides & Kumar Venkataraman, 
Informed Trading and Price Discovery Before Corporate Events, 125 J. FIN. 
ECON. 561, 561–62 (2017) (presenting evidence on the incorporation of infor-
mation); Jonathan Brogaard, Allen Carrion, Thibaut Moyaert, Ryan Riordan, 
Andriy Shkilko & Konstantin Sokolov, High Frequency Trading and Extreme Price 
Movements, J. FIN. ECON. 253, 253–54 (2018) (studying the effect of high-
frequency traders around extreme price movements); Markus Brunnermeier, 
Information Leakage and Market Efficiency, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 417, 417 (2005) 
(studying the use of leaked information by an informed trader); Jennifer 
Conrad, Sunil Wahal & Jin Xiang, High-Frequency Quoting, Trading and the 
Efficiency of Prices, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 271 (2015) (finding that high fre-
quency trading reduces trading costs and drives prices closer to random-walk 
behavior); Murray Z. Frank & Ali Sanati, How Does the Stock Market Absorb 
Shocks?, 129 J. FIN. ECON. 136, 136 (2018) (examining market responses to posi-
tive and negative news); Jeewon Jang & Jangkoo Kang, Probability of Price 
Crashes, Rational Speculative Bubbles, and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 
132 J. FIN. ECON. 222, 222–23 (2019) (examining the trading of sophisticated 
investors around times of high probability of extreme negative returns); George J. 
Jiang & Kevin X. Zhu, Information Shocks and Short-Term Market Underre-
action, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 43, 43 (2017) (studying price reactions to information 
shocks); Clara Vega, Stock Price Reaction to Public and Private Information, 
82 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 103–04 (2006) (studying the market efficiency associa-
tion of information with the arrival of informed and uninformed traders). 
162 Brav & Heaton, supra note 49, at 583. 
163 Id. 
164 See Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541, 541 (1988) (demonstrating the lack 
of predictive ability of regressions to predict individual stock returns). 
165 See id. 
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very small “effect sizes”166 that may have little real-world signif-
icance for an active trader.167 
B.Cammer Does Something Else 
1.A Large Weekly Trading Volume 
 The first Cammer factor is a large trading volume: “First, 
plaintiffs could have alleged there existed an average weekly 
trading volume during the class period in excess of a certain num-
ber of shares.”168 According to the Cammer court: 
 
[t]he reason the existence of an actively traded market, as ev-
idenced by a large weekly volume of stock trades, suggests there 
is an efficient market is because it implies significant investor 
interest in the company. Such interest, in turn, implies a like-
lihood that many investors are executing trades on the basis 
of newly available or disseminated corporate information.169 
 
Of course, there is nothing about “significant investor in-
terest in the company” that implies that trades resulting from 
such interest are “execut[ed] ... on the basis of newly available or 
disseminated information[,]” and nothing suggesting that such 
trading, if it occurs, is trading that fully reflects the information 
quickly in the stock price.170 
 The Cammer court cited the Bromberg and Lowenfels 
treatise, Bromberg & Lowenfels, 4 Securities Fraud and Com-
modities Fraud, § 8.6 (Aug. 1988), for the proposition that 
“[t]urnover measured by average weekly trading of two percent 
or more of the outstanding shares would justify a strong pre-
sumption that the market for the security is an efficient one; one 

166 A good source on effect sizes and relation to statistical power is PAUL D. 
ELLIS, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO EFFECT SIZES: STATISTICAL POWER, META-
ANALYSIS, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS (2010). 
167 See, e.g., Allen B. Atkins & Edward A. Dyl, Price Reversals, Bid-Ask 
Spreads, and Market Efficiency, 25 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 535, 535 
(1990) (presenting evidence that possible overreactions after large price changes 
are not profitable after taking transactions costs into account). 
168 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
2020] KILL CAMMER 459 
percent would justify a substantial presumption.”171 This was 
utter speculation by the commentators, neither of whom would 
reasonably be considered an expert in the efficient markets hy-
pothesis. Certainly, there was nothing in the existing literature 
to justify their assertion. 
 Volume is neither necessary nor sufficient for efficiency.172 
There is, in fact, a certain irony to the fact that a large volume is 
the first Cammer factor. One of the more intriguing results in 
rational expectations economics is the “no-trade theorem” of Paul 
Milgrom and Nancy Stokey.173 To put their insight simply, prices 
in their model adjust with no trade because rational agents im-
mediately recognize the price implications of new information.174 
The evidence on volume in financial economics is often interpreted 
as evidence of disagreement about price, in the sense that high 
volume is not expected when traders agree on the implications of 
new information for price.175 Volume is also related to liquidity 
needs—selling for cash rather than information trading.176 In all 
cases, price and volume seem to be related in complicated ways,177 
none of which allow volume to be a test for efficiency. 
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171 Id. 
172 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
173 Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowl-
edge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17, 17 (1982). 
174 Id. at 17–18. 
175 This disagreement can be rational or irrational. See, e.g., Jonathan M. 
Karpoff, A Theory of Trading Volume, 41 J. FIN. 1069, 1069 (1986) (presenting 
a theory of volume including agreement, disagreement, and divergent prior expec-
tations); Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders 
Are Above Average, 53 J. FIN. 1887, 1887 (1998) (studying the effects of over-
confidence on trade, including its tendency to increase volume); Meir Statman, 
Steven Thorley & Keith Vorkink, Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume, 19 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1531, 1531 (2006) (attributing high volume to investor over-
confidence about their trading skills); Ho-Mou Wu & Wen-Chung Guo, Asset 
Price Volatility and Trading Volume with Rational Beliefs, 23 J. ECON. THEORY 
795, 795 (2004) (studying the relation between volume and belief structures 
in rational markets). 
176 See, e.g., Joon Chae, Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry, and 
Timing Information, 60 J. FIN. 413, 413 (2005) (“Trading volume is generally 
characterized as either informed or uninformed (liquidity trading).”). 
177 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff, The Relation Between Price Changes 
and Trading Volume: A Survey, 22 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 109, 109 

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2.A Significant Number of Reports by Securities Analysts 
 The second Cammer factor is the existence of a significant 
number of reports by securities analysts: “Second, it would be 
persuasive to allege a significant number of securities analysts 
followed and reported on a company’s stock during the class 
period.”178 Here, the Cammer court’s rationale was that 
 
[t]he existence of such analysts would imply, for example, the 
[auditor reports at issue] were closely reviewed by investment 
professionals, who would in turn make buy/sell recommendations 
to client investors. In this way the market price of the stock 
would be bid up or down to reflect the financial information con-
tained in the [auditor’s] reports, as interpreted by the securi-
ties analysts.179 
 
This assumes a wealth of facts about the behavior of secu-
rities analysts and the response of client investors to their “buy/sell 
recommendations[,]” none of which implies price efficiency.180 
The court cited no source for its speculations here, not even the 
Bromberg & Lowenfels treatise.181 
 In fact, the importance of analysts in financial markets is 
questionable.182 Analysts are known to provide distorted recom-
mendations.183 Only a small minority of analyst recommenda-
tion changes seem to matter in markets, and even those depend 

(1987); Paula A. Tkac, A Trading Volume Benchmark: Theory and Evidence, 
34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 89, 89 (1999). 
178 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989). 
179 Id. 
180 See id. 
181 Id. 
182 See, e.g., Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Joonghyuk Kim, Susan D. Krische & 
Charles M.C. Lee, Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add 
Value?, 59 J. FIN. 1083, 1083 (2004) (providing evidence of both value-destructive 
and value-added analyst activity); Brett Trueman, Analyst Forecasts and Herding 
Behavior, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 97, 97 (1994) (finding that analysts stay close to 
prior earnings estimates and herd toward each other’s estimates); Ivo Welch, 
Herding Among Security Analysts, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 369, 369 (2000) (demon-
strating that analysts herd but not in a useful way on good information).  
183 See Ulrike Malmendier & Devin Shanthikumar, Do Security Analysts 
Speak in Two Tongues?, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 1287, 1287 (2014) (studying stra-
tegic distortions by security analysts). 
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heavily on whether the analyst is a reputational leader, is moving 
away from the consensus view, and what type of firm is involved.184 
The usefulness of analysts depends on the state of the economy.185 
Analysts with less industry experience before becoming analysts 
make poorer forecasts than analysts with industry-related prior 
experience.186 There is evidence that analysts add little or no 
value in the twentieth century,187 and excessive analyst cover-
age has been associated with overpricing and low returns.188 
 This second Cammer factor has another flaw, one that it 
shares with the next two Cammer factors as well: it tends to be a 
proxy for market capitalization.189 Larger firms have more ana-
lysts.190 While this size-bias may tend to generate correct efficiency 
determinations in cases involving large firms, it necessarily cre-
ates a relative bias against smaller firms that are—if traded on 
national exchanges exposed to professional traders—also quite 
likely to be traded in efficient markets.191 
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184 See, e.g., Michael B. Clement & Senyo Y. Tse, Financial Analyst Char-
acteristics and Herding Behavior in Forecasting, 60 J. FIN. 307, 307 (2005) 
(distinguishing between the value of analyst forecasts that are “bold” versus 
“herding” with other analysts); Roger K. Loh & René M. Stulz, When Are 
Analyst Recommendation Changes Influential?, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 593, 593 
(2011) (“We show that only 12% of recommendation changes are influential. 
Recommendation changes are more likely to be influential if they are from 
leader, star, previously influential analysts, issued away from consensus, 
accompanied by earnings forecasts, and issued on growth, small, high institu-
tional ownership, or high forecast dispersion firms.”). 
185 Roger K. Loh & René M. Stulz, Is Sell-Side Research More Valuable in 
Bad Times?, 73 J. FIN. 959, 959 (2018) (presenting evidence that analysts 
work harder and are relied on more in bad economic times). 
186 Daniel Bradley, Sinan Gokkaya & Xi Liu, Before an Analyst Becomes 
an Analyst: Does Industry Experience Matter?, 72 J. FIN. 751, 751 (2017). 
187 See, e.g., Oya Altinkilic, Robert S. Hansen, & Liyu Ye, Can Analysts 
Pick Stocks for the Long Run?, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 371 (2016) (finding a 
reduced information role for analysts in the period after 2003); Robert S. 
Hansen, What is the Value of Sell-Side Analysts? Evidence from Coverage 
Changes—A Discussion, 60 J. ACCT. & ECON. 58, 64 (2015) (discussing evi-
dence that “evidence indicating analysts’ reports are not particularly informative 
for the average investor”).  
188 John A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim & Christos Pantzalis, The Two 
Faces of Analyst Coverage, 34 FIN. MGMT. 99, 99 (2005). 
189 O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
190 Id. at 501. 
191 See Richard Roll, A Possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect, 36 J. 
FIN. 879, 879 (1981). 
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3.The Existence of Market-Makers and Arbitrageurs in the 
Security 
 The third Cammer factor is the existence of market-makers 
and arbitrageurs in the security: 
Third, it could be alleged the stock had numerous market makers. 
The existence of market makers and arbitrageurs would ensure 
completion of the market mechanism; these individuals would 
react swiftly to company news and reported financial results by 
buying or selling stock and driving it to a changed price level.192 
 
Again, the Cammer court cited no source.193 And, again, 
the existence of market makers and arbitrageurs does not imply 
“swiftly” reacting prices.194 Perhaps such prices that result from 
their presence are efficient; perhaps they are not. The market 
makers must not just be there; they must be good at their job. 
 Professor Fama’s original work on the efficient markets hy-
pothesis recognized as much, asking how many superior predictors 
of new information and processors of that information—the arbi-
trageurs in the Cammer framework—would be necessary to ensure 
that successive price changes were independent?195 He answered, 
“It is impossible to give a firm answer ... since the effectiveness of 
the superior [traders] probably depends more on the extent of their 
resources than on their number. Perhaps a single, well-informed 
and well-endowed specialist in each security is sufficient.”196 
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192 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989). One court, 
though accepting the factor itself, rejected the speculations of Bromberg and 
Lowenfels about the number of such market makers necessary for efficiency. 
See O’Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 502 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (citing Bromberg and Lowenfels, 
§ 8.6 at 8.815) (“Bromberg and Lowenfelds [sic] suggest a rule of thumb, 
under which the existence of at least five market makers would be some indicia 
of efficiency .... The authors do not cite any case law or economic studies to 
support their rule of thumb. As noted in the text above, the economic studies 
clearly do not support the authors’ suggestion. Furthermore, both Dr. Cox 
and Mr. Kangas testified that the rules of thumb suggested by Bromberg and 
Lowenfelds [sic] have no support in the economic literature. Therefore, I reject 
their rules of thumb as being unsupported speculation.”). 
193 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286. 
194 See O’Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 501–02. 
195 See Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1987); Fama, supra note 
148, at 40. 
196 Fama, supra note 148, at 40. 
2020] KILL CAMMER 463 
There is no authority in financial economics for linking market 
efficiency to a counting of arbitrageurs.197 
 Another objection to using, as an indicator of market effi-
ciency, the mere presence of arbitrageurs is a phenomenon known 
as the “limits to arbitrage”198—the possibility that mispricing 
can sometimes be difficult to bet against.199 The limits to arbitrage 
argument is powerful, with considerable support.200 It suggests 
reasons why this Cammer factor is unreliable, and also cau-
tions—as discussed further below—against assuming a free and 
open public market without some look at whether such limits to 
arbitrage are important for the security at issue.201 
 This factor, as mentioned above, is also likely to be too 
correlated with market capitalization to add much above it and 
is therefore relatively biased against small firms that neverthe-
less trade in efficient markets.202 
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197 The role of arbitrageurs in financial markets is a subject of much study. 
See, e.g., Suleyman Basak & Benjamin Croitoru, On the Role of Arbitrageurs 
in Rational Markets, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 143, 143 (2006) (providing an example 
of an article discussing the role of arbitrageurs in financial markets). 
198 The seminal work is Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits to 
Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35 (1997) (presenting a theoretical model where arbitra-
geurs are limited in their ability to take advantage of mispricing because investors 
may withdraw funds if the mispricing gets worse before being corrected). 
199 Id. at 42. 
200 See, e.g., Malcolm Baker & Serkan Savasoglu, Limited Arbitrage in 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 93–94 (2002) (finding evidence 
of limited arbitrage in risk arbitrage around mergers and acquisitions); John 
A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim & Christos Pantzalis, Arbitrage Risk and 
Stock Mispricing, 45 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 907, 907 (2010) (finding 
supportive evidence); Mark Mitchell, Todd Pulvino & Erik Stafford, Limited 
Arbitrage in Equity Markets, 57 J. FIN. 551, 551–52 (2002) (identifying apparent 
mispricing of parent companies relative to their subsidiary, and attributing 
the survival of the mispricing to the risks of arbitrage); Eli Ofek, Matthew 
Richardson & Robert F. Whitelaw, Limited Arbitrage and Short Sales Re-
strictions: Evidence from the Options Markets, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (2004) 
(finding evidence of limits to arbitrage in options markets); Jeffrey Pontiff, Costly 
Arbitrage: Evidence from Closed-End Funds, 111 Q.J. ECON. 1135, 1136 (1996) 
(documenting limits to arbitrage against high-discount closed-end funds). 
201 See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits to Arbi-
trage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35 (1997). 
202 See O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
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4.The Eligibility of the Company to File an S-3 Registration 
Statement 
 The fourth Cammer factor is the eligibility of the issuer to 
file an S-3 registration statement: 
Fourth, as discussed, it would be helpful to allege the Company 
was entitled to file an S-3 Registration Statement in connec-
tion with public offerings or, if ineligible, such ineligibility was 
only because of timing factors rather than because the mini-
mum stock requirements set forth in the instructions to Form 
S-3 were not met. Again, it is the number of shares traded 
and value of shares outstanding that involve the facts which 
imply efficiency.203 
 
This factor was based on the fact that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission allowed issuers to use Form S-3 if they, 
“are widely followed by professional analysts[,]”204 since the 
Commission believed, “that the market operates efficiently for 
these companies, i.e., that the disclosure in Exchange Act re-
ports and other communications by the registrant, such as press 
releases, has already been disseminated and accounted for by 
the market place.”205 
 Thus, the Form S-3 factor is redundant of the second fac-
tor—the presence of securities analysts—and simply pushes the 
buck to the Commission: the securities of issuers that can use 
Form S-3 are probably efficient because the SEC allows Form S-
3 for issuers it thinks are trading in efficient markets.206 Of 
course, the SEC is almost surely correct, but not because they 
have been conscientious in testing for efficiency every issuer 
able to file on Form S-3. Finally, as mentioned above, this factor 
is essentially a proxy for market capitalization, and therefore 
relatively biased against smaller firms.207 
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203 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989). 
204 Id. at 1284 (quoting SEC Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 
63,693 (1980)). 
205 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1284. 
206 See id. at 1284–85. 
207 See O’Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 503. 
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5.Movement of the Stock Price Caused by Unexpected  
Corporate Events or Financial Releases 
 The fifth Cammer factor is a history of immediate move-
ment of the stock price caused by unexpected corporate events or 
financial releases: 
Finally, it would be helpful to a plaintiff seeking to allege an 
efficient market to allege empirical facts showing a cause and 
effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or fi-
nancial releases and an immediate response in the stock price. 
This, after all, is the essence of an efficient market and the 
foundation for the fraud on the market theory.208 
 
 There are two elementary errors at play here.209 The first 
error is that a price need not react to any particular unexpected 
corporate event or financial release.210 As Professor Langevoort 
has observed, markets may not react because, “the market had 
figured out the essential truth on its own[,]”211 or, said differently, 
the events identified by experts and their staffs in litigation and 
then compared against the price series for reaction may already 
have been impacted in the price through an unidentified means 
of information transmission.212 But the real problem comes in 
defining what it means to react. In practice, the definition, until 
recently, meant the generation of statistically significant price 
reactions, that is, identifying events and then concluding that 
the market is inefficient if the resulting price reaction is not 
statistically significant.213 This test assumes that prices are not 
efficient unless price reactions are large enough to be statistically 
significant.214 This reflects a serious misunderstanding of both 
efficiency and statistics.215 
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208 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287. 
209 See id. 
210 See Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Re-
flections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
37, 57 (2015). 
211 Id. at 54. 
212 See id. at 52. 
213 See id. at 46–47. 
214 See id. 
215 Some confusion in the cases appears to trace to the mistaken character-
ization of statistical significance in an influential article by a law professor 

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 Prices can react efficiently to information even though the 
price reactions themselves are not so large in size as to approach 
statistical significance.216 Statistical significance is just a measure 
of the size of a reaction relative to its average and its variability, 
but nothing says that the corporate event must have a certain size 
to be efficiently reflected in the security’s price, especially since, as 
just observed, part of the information may already be in the price 
before the news released identified by the litigant’s expert.217 Thus, 
while a statistically significant reaction to a firm-specific news event 
might be evidence that information was reflected in the price (ab-
sent confounding effects), the converse is not true—the failure of 
the price to react so extremely as to be two standard deviations 
from average does not establish that the market is inefficient; it 
may mean only that the correctly sized value impact that oc-
curred was less than 1.96 standard deviations from the mean.218 

without advanced training in financial economics. See Daniel R. Fischel, Use 
of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded 
Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (1982). Fischel incorrectly assumed that returns 
needed to be statistically significant against an assumed model to be evidence 
of injury: 
By comparing this predicted return with the actual return imme-
diately after disclosure in 1978 of the correct information, a 
conclusion could be reached about the effect of the alleged failure 
to disclose the costs of compliance with environmental regula-
tions. If the difference between the actual return and the pre-
dicted return is not statistically significant, investors were 
not injured. 
Id. at 19. Fischel appears not to have understood the low statistical power of 
his model and how that renders statistical significance unreliable for deter-
mining price impact (injury). See id. 
216 One frequent securities expert witness studies the stocks in the S&P 
500, and found that some stocks “respond to earnings announcements in a 
statistically significant manner only about half of the time, implying that a 
requirement that a stock respond in a statistically significant manner to news 
events all or nearly all the time may not be consistent with the data.” Tabak, 
supra note 13. Given the almost unquestionable efficiency of the pricing of 
this set of stocks—if they are not efficiently priced, none are—this is a near-
ideal illustration of the disconnect between a price reaction and whether that 
reaction is so large as to reach statistical significance. 
217 See id. 
218 See STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STA-
TISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, 

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There are court opinions in nine-figure securities cases that 
would fail a college freshman’s statistics exam on such reason-
ing, as in the case of In re American International Group, Inc.,219 
a case where the court determined that defendants had rebutted 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption on certain dates because 
price moves were statistically significant only at the 10 percent 
level (size) but not the 5 percent level.220 It used to be rare but 
refreshing when courts got it right.221 As courts have become 
more aware of the games defendants play in such situations, they 
have begun more frequently rejecting the junk science require-
ment of statistical significance proffered by defense experts.222 

AND LIVES, at 1–2, 45, 222 (2008) (providing for a definitive treatment of the 
widespread misunderstanding of statistical significance and its consequences). 
219 265 F.R.D. 157, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated and remanded, 689 F.3d 
229 (2d Cir. 2012). 
220 The court determined that the lack of a statistically significant price 
move at the 5% level on March 30 and 31, 2005, demonstrated that the fraud 
had not impacted the stock price. Id. at 185–87. The same court’s determina-
tions regarding AIG bonds have been severely criticized as well. See Hartz-
mark et al., supra note 9, at 654–55 (criticizing the AIG court, which “found 
insufficient empirical evidence to hold that the $1.71 billion in AIG bonds, 
issued by the world’s largest insurance company, traded in open, developed, 
and efficient markets.”). Courts continue to botch the application of this factor in 
more recent cases. See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan 
Mortg. Corp., No. 4:08CV0160, 2018 WL 3861840, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 
2018) (“Upon weighing the evidence, as the Court must, the Court holds that 
OPERS has failed to establish market efficiency.”) Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation’s market capitalization was in the many billions of dollars. 
The Court plainly lacked an understanding of the statistical evidence. Id. at 
11 (“Statistical significance, however, is essential to give meaning to statisti-
cal evidence. As courts have recognized, absent statistical significance, corre-
lation is meaningless.”). 
221 In one reported case, the judge saw through the fallacious argument 
that “in an efficient market material news should result in a statistically 
significant change in [the issuer’s] stock price.” In re Nature’s Sunshine Product’s 
Inc., 251 F.R.D. 656, 664 (D. Utah 2008) (rejecting defendants’ argument that 
market for stock was not efficient because “of the 93 event days chosen by 
[plaintiffs’ expert], only 23 of those days (or less than 25%) result in a statis-
tically significant change to Nature’s stock price”). 
222 See, e.g., Vizirgianakis v. Aeterna Zentaris, Inc., No. 18-2474, 2019 WL 
2305491, at *2 (3d Cir. May 30, 2019) (“Aeterna’s hired expert, Dr. David 
Tabak, responded to the declaration of plaintiffs’ expert, pointing out that Dr. 
Werner had not proven—to a 95% confidence level—that the alleged misrep-
resentations made on August 30, 2011 impacted the price of Aeterna’s com-
mon stock. The district court found this evidence insufficient to rebut the 

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 The second error is that the existence of a large price reaction 
does not imply efficiency or the need for news.223 Why assume that 
the large price reaction was accurate?224 Statistical significance 
certainly does not imply accuracy.225 Indeed, a price overreaction 
will generally achieve a higher level of statistical significance than 
an accurate price reaction.226 Early commentators recognized even 
before Cammer that, “[t]he fact that trades affect stock prices, 
however, is unrelated to the efficient market thesis, as is the fact 
that traders act upon the available information.”227 
 The fact is that while prices in efficient markets react 
quickly,228 the fully reflective price reaction may be too small to 
reach statistical significance.229 That should not matter, since 
statistical significance is nothing more than a measure of rela-
tive size, and nothing in the law says that only price impacts 
that big or bigger are actionable.230 Additionally, the presence of 

presumption. It aptly noted that plaintiffs do not have the burden to prove price 
impact (or lack thereof), so it was not surprising that their expert’s report did 
no such thing.”). 
223 See David Romer, Rational Asset-Price Movements Without News, 83 
AM. ECON. REV. 1112, 1113 (1993) (demonstrating the potential for prices to 
react because of the trading of other traders rather than news). 
224 See, e.g., Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes, 
and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 454 (2006) (“A stock can be 
significantly mispriced and still respond promptly to news. For example, a 
stock that was overpriced by fifty percent could jump ten percent in response 
to a positive announcement, as many dot-com stocks did, and still be over-
priced by fifty percent, if not more.”). 
225 See id. at 449. 
226 This is because an overreaction will be larger in magnitude and thus 
more likely to be significant, since the test statistic is typically a function of 
the observed price less the average price. 
227 Black, supra note 62, at 933. 
228 Price reactions on exchanges have reacted quickly for decades. See, e.g., 
Catherine S. Woodruff & A.J. Senchack, Jr., Intradaily Price-Volume Ad-
justments of NYSE Stocks to Unexpected Earnings, 43 J. FIN. 467 (1988) 
(studying speed of adjustment to earnings surprises); Prem C. Jain, Response 
of Hourly Stock Prices and Trading Volume to Economic News, 61 J. BUS. 219 
(1988) (studying speed of adjustment to macroeconomic news). This is even 
more so today. 
229 See Cornell & Rutten, supra note 224, at 449. 
230 Thus, assertions that some number of returns must be statistically sig-
nificant are illogical and not based in any proper reasoning from financial 
economics. For an example of such an assertion by a defendant, see Wilson v. 
LSB Indus., Inc., No. 15CIV7614RAGWG, 2018 WL 3913115, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 

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statistical significance does not imply accuracy, and therefore, does 
not imply efficiency.231 Again, as a measure of size—relative to 
the average and the variability of the return or price—statistical 
significance is more likely to be found when prices overreact than 
react correctly.232 
C.Other Factors 
 In Krogman v. Sterritt,233 the District Court for the Northern 
District of Texas stated that “[e]conomic theory suggests that 
several other factors may be relevant in determining market 
efficiency[,]” citing another case that cited two law review arti-
cles.234 It appears, however, that these additional factors were 
proposed by defendant’s economic expert.235 Unsurprisingly, 
these factors are no more reliable than the Cammer factors. 
1.The Capitalization of the Company 
 Krogman asserted that “[m]arket capitalization, calculated 
as the number of shares multiplied by the prevailing share price, 
may be an indicator of market efficiency because there is a greater 
incentive for stock purchasers to invest in more highly capital-
ized corporations.”236 There is no support in the literature for 
this assertion. 
 The “incentive” for investing in a security is often a complex 
question of risk and return, where both are rationally analyzed 
with respect to the other assets that the investor owns. There is, 
in finance theory, nothing to suggest that the security of a highly 
capitalized corporation is per se more attractive to an investor, 
and it is easy to come up with counterexamples where that 
would not be true, such as if the security of the highly capitalized 

Aug. 13, 2018) (“Next, defendants assert that the event study failed to establish 
market efficiency because it found statistically significant residual returns on 
only two of the three dates it analyzed.”). The court was unpersuaded by this 
misleading argument. Id. 
231 See Tabak, supra note 13. 
232 See id. 
233 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
234 Id. at 477. 
235 Id. at 478. 
236 Id. 
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corporation had a poor risk-return contribution to the investor’s 
current portfolio than the security of a small-capitalization firm. 
Put more bluntly, any student in an introductory investment class 
asked to determine whether a security was a good investment for a 
hypothetical investor would get zero credit for an answer that a 
particular security was a good investment because the firm that 
issued it had a high market capitalization. 
Larger capitalization firms may be more efficiently priced 
than smaller firms,237 but this does not imply that smaller firms 
are not priced quite efficiently, though in lesser degree than 
large firms.238 
2.The Bid-Ask Spread of the Stock 
 Krogman also asserted that “[a] large bid-ask spread is 
indicative of an inefficient market, because it suggests that the 
stock is too expensive to trade.”239 There is no evidence for this 
assertion. 
 As with the first Krogman factor (high capitalization), the 
rationale given—“the stock is too expensive to trade”—is non-
sensical.240 If that were true, there would be no trades for the 
security at the assumedly large bid-ask spread. But firms with 
large bid-ask spreads trade, just at the larger spread.241 In any 
event, bid-ask spread does not measure inefficiency.242 Bid-ask 
spreads are sensitive to information imbalances, and the bid-ask 
spread compensates in part for the risks of this asymmetry.243 

237 See, e.g., Josef Lakonishok & Inmoo Lee, Are Insider Trades Informa-
tive?, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 79, 82 (2001) (finding that insider trading is more 
profitable at smaller firms, consistent with the conjecture that larger firms 
are more efficiently priced). 
238 See Bradford Cornell & John Haut, How Efficient Is Sufficient: Apply-
ing the Concept of Market Efficiency in Litigation, 74 BUS. LAW. 417, 420–22 
(2019) (discussing different degrees of efficiency). 
239 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
240 Id. at 474. 
241 Id. at 478. 
242 Id. 
243 See Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-
Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457, 1457–58, 1465 (1983); Lawrence R. Glosten, 
Components of the Bid-Ask Spread and the Statistical Properties of Transac-
tions Prices, 42 J. FIN. 1293, 1293 (1987) (decomposing the bid-ask spread 
into a component related to information asymmetry and a component related 
to monopoly power); Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating 

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There are also reasons why in an efficient market the bid-ask 
spread will increase as the size of the firm decreases.244 Bid-ask 
spread also measures liquidity.245 In the large literature that 
exists on the bid-ask spread,246 researchers do not equate bid-
ask spreads with efficiency or characterize stocks with large bid-
ask spreads as being “too expensive to trade.”247 
3.The Percentage of Stock Not Held by Insiders 
 Finally, Krogman quoted the expert’s affidavit in asserting 
that “[b]ecause insiders may have private information that is not 
yet reflected in stock prices, the prices of stocks that have greater 
holdings by insiders are less likely to accurately reflect all avail-
able information about the security.”248 There is no evidence to 
support the conjecture that publicly traded stocks with high insider 
ownership are inefficiently priced. To the contrary, the market 
appears to charge a higher cost of equity where informed insider 
trading may be used to exploit investors.249 
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the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 131, 140–41 
(1988) (demonstrating that a significant amount of the spread is due to in-
formation asymmetry; P.C. Venkatesh & R. Chiang, Information Asymmetry 
and the Dealer’s Bid-Ask Spread: A Case Study of Earnings and Dividend 
Announcements, 41 J. FIN. 1089, 1090 (1986) (studying dealer use of the bid-
ask spread in response to possible information asymmetry). 
244 See generally Richard Roll, A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective 
Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market, 39 J. FIN. 1127 (1984). See also J.Y. 
Choi, Dan Salandro & Kuldeep Shastri, On the Estimation of the Bid-Ask 
Spreads: Theory and Evidence, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 219 
(1988) (confirming Roll’s model in empirical tests). 
245 See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-
Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 243 (1986) (“And, rather than suggesting 
an ‘anomaly’ or an indication of market inefficiency, our return-spread rela-
tion represents a rational response by an efficient market to the existence of 
the spread.”); Benjamin M. Blau & Ryan J. Whitby, The Volatility of Bid-Ask 
Spreads, 44 FIN. MGMT. 851, 851, 869 (2015) (examining the relation between 
bid-ask spreads and returns due to liquidity). 
246 In addition to the sources cited above, see also Hans R. Stoll, Inferring 
the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests, 44 J. FIN. 
115 (1989). 
247 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 245, at 243. 
248 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
249 See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider 
Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 97 (2002) (finding that the enforcement of insider 
trading laws reduces the cost of equity). 
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 Of course, all firms have insiders that may have private 
information not yet reflected in stock prices,250 but there is no 
reason to believe that firms with greater holdings by insiders have 
more such information. This factor also illustrates well a serious 
problem with a list of ad hoc factors: they can tempt a court to 
view factors one a time instead of considering the factors in light of 
one another.251 The Krogman court asserted that inside ownership 
could lead to inefficient pricing, but inside ownership is prevalent 
at some of today’s largest market-capitalization companies like 
Alphabet Inc. (Google) and Facebook.252 The idea that the securi-
ties of these companies are not traded in an efficient market (for 
purposes of the fraud on the market presumption) because of their 
high percentage insider ownership is absurd and without sup-
port in any reliable financial economic studies. 
III.A FREE AND OPEN PUBLIC MARKET IS EFFICIENT 
 How can we do securities litigation without junk science? 
The best thing after killing Cammer would be a return to the early 
days of the fraud on the market presumption, with a modern check. 
Those were days that required only a free and open public mar-
ket.253 In Basic, the Supreme Court quoted the following sen-
tence from an earlier Eleventh Circuit case: “The idea of a free 
and open public market is built upon the theory that competing 
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security 
brings [sic] about a situation where the market price reflects as 
nearly as possible a just price.”254 The idea of a “free and open 
public market” is, of course, an abstraction like the idea of an 
“efficient market.” But it is a far less demanding abstraction. As the 

250 See, e.g., Shijung Cheng, Venky Nagar & Madhav V. Rajan, Insider Trades 
and Private Information: The Special Case of Delayed-Disclosure Trades, 20 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1833, 1861 (2007) (finding strong evidence of the informa-
tiveness of certain insider trades at S&P 500 firms). 
251 See Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 474 (enumerating factors courts consider 
when addressing degree of market efficiency). 
252 Id. at 478. 
253 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 475 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting the 
internet rendered Cammer factors useless). 
254 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (quoting Lipton v. Doc-
umation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 748 (CA11 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985)). 
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Cammer court recognized, “An open market is one in which any-
one, or at least a large number of persons, can buy or sell.”255 
For courts that must—even when they deal in theories and ab-
stractions—make decisions about the messy real world, the no-
tion of “a free and open public market” is far better suited to 
litigation than the financial economists’ ever-evolving theory of 
efficient markets.256 Appealing to the existence of social science 
evidence in 1979 and 1980 was unnecessary but understandable 
for courts relying—as they long had—on securities market prices.257 
Requiring market efficiency in the exact sense of this theoretical 
concept was a mistake. It is also clearly not what the Supreme 
Court intended in Basic, where the Court expressly disavowed 
adopting “any particular theory of how quickly and completely 
publicly available information is reflected in market price.”258 
The fact that the meaning of “efficiency” in fraud on the market 
jurisprudence was not identical to that of financial economics 
was again emphasized in the Court’s 2014 Halliburton decision, 
rejecting a 
focus[ ] on the debate among economists about the degree to 
which the market price of a company’s stock reflects public in-
formation about the company—and thus the degree to which an 
investor can earn an abnormal, above-market return by trading 
on such information .... The Court instead based the [Basic] pre-
sumption on the fairly modest premise that “market professionals 
generally consider most publicly announced material statements 
about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.” ... 
Even the foremost critics of the efficient-capital-markets hy-
pothesis acknowledge that public information generally affects 
stock prices.259 
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255 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.17 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting 
Bromberg & Lowenfels § 8.6). 
256 Id. at 1276.  
257 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 255.  
258 Id. at 248 n.28. 
259 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 271–72 (2014). 
It is important to recognize, however, that the Supreme Court only a year before 
had arguably characterized the fraud on the market presumption as one that 
“springs from the very concept of market efficiency.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. 
Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 462 (2013). This is language reminiscent of 
those courts that may forget the origins of fraud on the market in a pre-
efficient markets framework, though the later characterization of efficiency in 
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 Complying with Basic’s demand for efficiency as empha-
sized in Halliburton demands that there be a free and open pub-
lic market where information is reflected in market price quickly 
and completely enough for it to be reasonable to consider that 
the price at which plaintiffs purchased or sold was artificial as a 
result of the alleged fraud.260 A plaintiff invokes the presump-
tion by pleading the existence of a free and open public market 
for the security at issue, that is, the ability of buyers and sellers 
to engage in securities trades without significant restrictions on 
either buyers or sellers.261 For class certification, a plaintiff would 
present evidence on the free and open nature of the market for 
the security.262 Can investors buy and sell in the market without 
substantial restrictions on participation like substantial lockups 
of potential sellers or bans on short selling?263 The answer for 
exchange-traded securities will—as it should be—almost always 
be yes.264 
 But here is the modern check: sometimes there will be suffi-
cient constraints—violations of the “free and open” requirement—
that will make the presumption unavailable, such as an inability 
to sell short which can prevent the market price from reflecting the 
views of relatively pessimistic traders265 or lockups that remove 
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Halliburton suggests this to mean nothing more than that the market responds 
quickly and completely (to some extent) to new information. 
260 Halliburton Co., 573 U.S. at 282–83. 
261 See id. at 259–60, 268. 
262 See id. at 258, 261. 
263 See Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 
J. FIN. 1151, 1162 (1977). 
264 See Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and 
Stock Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 210–11 (2002). 
265 The classic explanation is Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Di-
vergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1162 (1977) (stating that “without short 
selling the price of a security is raised if there is divergence of opinion. A sufficient 
amount of short selling could increase the volume of the security outstanding 
until its price was forced down to the average valuation of all investors.”). 
There is substantial evidence that short selling is important to market pric-
ing. See, e.g., Ekkehart Boehmer & Juan (Julie) Wu, Short Selling and the 
Price Discovery Process, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 287, 318 (2013) (documenting the 
greater accuracy of stock prices when short sellers are active); Karl B. Diether, 
Kuan-Hui Lee & Ingrid M. Werner, Short-Sale Strategies and Return Pre-
dictability, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 575, 604 (2009) (examining the extent and 
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potential sellers from participating in the market, with results 
akin to short-selling restrictions.266 
 Overall, if you can look it up on a Bloomberg terminal and 
trade it with a major financial firm, it is almost surely worthy of 
the label “efficient” for purposes of fraud on the market, absent 
independent proof of truly binding restrictions on the trading of 
an important subset of potential buyers or sellers.267 
 Efficiency in this sense is consistent with the common-
sense approach of the fraud on the market jurisprudence before 
the introduction of efficiency in the social science sense, the sense 
of financial economics.268 It also is consistent with the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the duties of ERISA fiduciaries.269 It was in 2014, 
the same year as Halliburton, when the Court in Fifth Third 
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer held that it “usually is not imprudent 
to assume that a major stock market ... provides the best esti-
mate of the value of the stocks traded on it that is available to 
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importance of short selling in U.S. stocks); Charles M. Jones & Owen A. La-
mont, Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 237 
(2002); Mahdi Nezafat, Mark Schroder & Qinghai Wang, Short-Sale Con-
straints, Information Acquisition, and Asset Prices, 172 J. ECON. THEORY 273, 
274 (2017) (presenting a model that short-sales constraints during financial 
crises increase volatility and may not support prices); Pedro A.C. Saffi & Kari 
Sigurdsson, Price Efficiency and Short Selling, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 821, 822–
23 (2011) (examining the same for global stocks). 
266 See, e.g., Robin Greenwood, Trading Restrictions and Stock Prices, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 509 (2009) (demonstrating substantial price impact from re-
strictions on trading in certain Japanese stocks). 
267 This approach is also consistent with the fact that courts generally do 
not apply the fraud on the market presumption in cases involving newly issued 
securities, since such securities are sold only by the issuer and are not subject to 
the views of other sellers, including short sellers. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen 
“Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 2672 
CRB (JSC), 2018 WL 1142884, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018) (citations omit-
ted) (stating “a number of courts have declined to apply Basic in cases involv-
ing newly issued securities”). There are often seller lockups on insiders at the 
time of the IPO. See Alon Brav & Paul A. Gompers, The Role of Lockups in 
Initial Public Offerings, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 1 (2003). This keeps a number of 
sellers off the market for a time. In addition, options trading is often delayed 
for short time after an IPO. Put options trades are one way for investors with 
a negative view on a stock to bet against it. 
268 See Basic v. Levinson, 268 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (citing to literature 
supporting efficient capital market theory). 
269 See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2470–71 (2014).  
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him.”270 Efficiency for fraud on the market purposes need not be 
any more difficult. Just as it “usually is not imprudent” for an 
ERISA fiduciary “to assume that a major stock market ... provides 
the best estimate of the value of the stocks traded on it that is 
available to him[,]” it usually is not imprudent for an investor to 
assume the same, and certainly it usually is not imprudent to 
assume that false information disseminated in such a market 
can create an artificial price at which investors will trade.271 Of 
course, “usually” is not “always,” and there may be evidence of 
sufficient problems in the relevant market—problems that limit 
the interaction of active buyers and sellers—to call the assumption 
(and the resulting presumption) into question.272 In those cases, 
the presumption might be unavailable, and in all cases, the de-
fendant would, at the class certification stage, retain its ability 
to demonstrate the lack of a price impact (which is the lack of 
fraud-induced artificiality) in the price of the security at issue.273 
The point is, all this work can be done more easily and far more 
reliably without the junk science of the Cammer factors. 
CONCLUSION 
 In a 2010 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]he absence of Cammer efficiency 
does not mean that prices are unreliable.”274 This was a laudable 
statement, but far from enough. Cammer is junk science. The 
Cammer factors (and the additional factors that courts use) do 
not do what they claim: distinguish efficient security pricing from 
inefficient security pricing.275 Normally, junk science comes to 
litigation via the parties and safeguards on the admissibility of 
expert opinion—while by no means always adequate—to catch 
much of it and prevent it from living long in our legal system. 
When a judge fashions the junk science, as occurred in Cammer, 
and when other judges adopt the junk science, it can live on for 
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271 See id.  
272 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 258, 261. 
273 See id. at 261. 
274 Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010). 
275 But see id. at 1103. 
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decades by force of precedential acceptance.276 But let any court 
ask a highly qualified and well-trained financial expert to pro-
duce a single peer-reviewed article unrelated to litigation and 
not written by a frequent expert witness, where that article con-
cludes a market is inefficient or efficient based on trading volume, 
number of analyst reports, the presence of market makers, the 
eligibility of filing a Form S-3, or a history of price reactions to 
corporate events. No such article will be forthcoming. It does not 
exist. It does not exist because those are not reliable tests for 
distinguishing efficiency from inefficiency. 
 The birth and survival of the Cammer factors—so obvi-
ously unrelated to the financial economics of market efficiency—
raise the question whether more such phenomena exist where a 
junk science that can prosper for decades because the parties to 
the litigation have distorted incentives to challenge the unreliable 
methodologies that are sometimes helpful for them. This more 
general phenomenon deserves study to see if it exists in other areas 
of litigation. The effort requires a substantial amount of domain 
knowledge on the methodology that is used and a knowledge of the 
applicable law, so it is well-suited to study by scholars trained in 
law and another discipline. Indeed, such insights ought to be a 
major contribution of scholars with such bi-disciplinary training. 
 For now, however, to borrow from Shakespeare: the next 
thing we do, let’s kill all the Cammer factors.277 
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